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The provision of public goods under asymmetric information has most often
been viewed as a mechanism design problem under the aegis of an uninformed
mediator. This paper focuses on institutional contexts without such mediator.
Contributors privately informed on their willingness to pay non-cooperatively
offer contribution schedules to an agent who produces the public good on their
behalf. In any separating and informative equilibrium of this common agency
game under asymmetric information, instead of reducing marginal contribu-
tions to free-ride on others, principals do so to screen the agent’s endogenous
private information obtained from privately observing other principals’ of-
fers. Under weak conditions, existence of a differentiable equilibrium is shown.
Equilibria are always ex post inefficient and interim efficient if and only if the
type distribution has a linear inverse hazard rate. This points at the major
inefficiency of contribution games under asymmetric information and stands in
contrast with the more positive efficiency result that the common agency lit-
erature has unveiled when assuming complete information. Extensions of the
model address direct contracting between principals, the existence of pooling
uninformative equilibria and the robustness of our findings to the possibility
that principals entertain more complex communication with their agent.
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1 Introduction
Since Green and Laffont (1979) the provision of public goods under asymmetric infor-
mation has most often been viewed as a mechanism design problem under the aegis of
an uninformed mediator having a full commitment ability. This paper relaxes this as-
sumption and focuses on cases without such mediator. Contributors privately informed
on their willingness to pay non-cooperatively offer contribution schedules to an agent who
produces the public good on their behalf.
Our first motivation for undertaking such analysis comes from observing that, in much
real-world settings, centralized mechanisms and uninformed mediators with a strong abil-
ity to commit to those mechanisms are not available. Health, environment, multilateral
foreign aid and other transnational public goods are all examples of public goods with
voluntary provision by sovereign countries. There is no mediator to design the mecha-
nisms that those countries should play to reveal their preferences. Politics and games
of influence among interest groups offer other important examples. Key decision-makers
might not have much commitment power to organize and ex ante design competition
between interest groups. Instead, they only react ex post to the lobbying contributions
they receive from those groups.1 In those contexts, it is important to know whether a
game of voluntary contributions fares well under asymmetric information, i.e., what are
the positive and normative properties of the corresponding Bayesian-Nash equilibria.
Our second motivation is theoretical. Although earlier works on asymmetric informa-
tion (Clarke 1971, Groves 1973) studied specific mechanisms for the provision of public
goods, the bulk of the literature has departed from the analysis of real-world institutions
to characterize instead properties of the whole set of incentive-feasible allocations.2 In
the standard framework (sometimes referred to as the centralized mechanism approach
in what follows), an uninformed mediator moving first designs a mechanism for informed
players. This mechanism induces an equilibrium allocation which is Bayesian incentive
compatible, feasible (i.e., contributions cover the cost of the public good) and might
respect the agents’ veto constraints. No other institutional constraint on the kind of
mechanisms or on the communication devices that can be used is considered. In this
paper, we impose that such allocation is an equilibrium outcome of a game of voluntary
contributions taking place under asymmetric information. In such a game, a privately
informed contributor might want to offer a contribution schedule flexible enough to cope
with different realizations of others’ preferences. An agent collects contributions, endoge-
nously learns something about the contributors’ preferences from observing their mere
offers and chooses the level of public good accordingly.
This institutional setting is thus viewed as a common agency game under asymmetric
information with privately informed contributors non-cooperatively designing contribu-
tion schedules. We are interested in the general properties of such games both in terms
of how information is aggregated, and in terms of ex post and interim efficiency.
1Grossman and Helpman (1994).
2This research strategy of the public good literature stands in sharp contrast with the way the literature
on auctions has evolved. There, equal efforts have been devoted to the study of particular auction formats
and to the characterization of the general properties of unrestricted auction mechanisms.
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Our first important results are related to the process by which the equilibrium out-
come aggregates contributors’ private information. At a best response to what others
offer, a given principal designs his own contribution not only to signal his preferences
to the common agent but also to extract the endogenous private information that this
agent may have learned from observing others’ offers. Signaling turns out to be costless
in our environment because of private values (the principals’ private information does
not enter directly into the agent’s utility function) and risk-neutrality. Focusing on in-
formative outcomes that aggregate information efficiently, we study separating Bayesian
equilibria, i.e., contributors with different valuations offer different contribution schedules.
In our private values environment, those contributions are the same as if the agent was
perfectly informed on principals’ valuations and out-of equilibrium beliefs following unex-
pected offers are irrelevant in characterizing the equilibrium. Instead, screening is costly.
Each principal has to learn what the agent has endogenously learnt from observing oth-
ers’ contributions.3 Standard mechanism design techniques can nevertheless be used to
compute best responses. When choosing how much to contribute, each principal behaves
actually as a monopsonist in front of an agent who is endogenously privately informed
on the preferences of other contributors. By a standard screening argument,4 this prin-
cipal contributes less at the margin than his marginal valuation to decrease the agent’s
information rent. Intuitively, the agent can always ask for more from a given principal by
pretending that others have not contributed enough. Each principal has then to reduce
his own contribution to make that strategy less attractive to the agent.
As far as existence is concerned, we show that the marginal contribution in any equi-
librium solves a complex functional equation with rather stringent boundary conditions.
This equation links the equilibrium’s marginal contribution, its inverse and its derivative.
It is thus non-local by nature. Boundary conditions come from characterizing the bidding
behavior of the two principals who have the highest and the lowest valuations, and who
altogether implement a given output. We show that there always exists a differentiable
equilibrium of the game under weak conditions on distributions. The idea is to analyze
best responses in terms of the distribution of marginal contributions that a principal
offers and to provide conditions under which that best-response mapping is monotoni-
cally decreasing: If principal 2’s distribution of marginal contributions increases in the
sense of first-order stochastic dominance, principal 1’s own distribution decreases. This
monotonicity helps defining a set of distributions which is stable by the best-response
mapping and from which a fixed-point can be found using Schauder’s Second Theorem.
Finally, we also show uniqueness when the distribution of types is uniform.
Turning now to the normative properties of those equilibria, any equilibrium is nec-
essarily ex post inefficient. For screening purposes, each principal always contributes less
at the margin than what it is worth to him and “free-riding” arises. This is not to hide
3This is related to the notion of “market information” that Epstein and Peters (1999) stressed in
multi-principals environments. Those authors derived general Revelation Principles for multi-principals
games where each principal should try to learn from the agent whatever information he has on his own
preferences but also on what he privately learns from observing others’ offers. In a pure strategy Bayesian
equilibrium as analyzed below, principals perfectly conjecture the strategy followed by others. They are
a priori unaware of their exact types but may try to learn those types from asking the common agent
about what he learns from observing offers made by other principals.
4Laffont and Martimort (2002, Chapter 3).
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his type to the common agent as the centralized mechanism design approach predicts.5
Instead, a principal induces less production to reduce the information rent that the agent
gets from learning the preferences of others. Downward distortions below the first-best
necessarily follow from this new source of distortion. The absence of a mediator forces
privately informed contributors to communicate through a self-interested agent. Commu-
nication occurs via the offer of a contribution schedule which reveals the corresponding
principal’s type in any informative equilibrium.
Given that ex post efficiency fails and interim efficiency is a more relevant efficiency
concept under asymmetric information, we ask whether equilibria are nevertheless interim
efficient and under which circumstances if any.6 The additional screening costs from
having communication taking place through the agent explain why the Bayesian equilibria
of the voluntary contribution game generally fail to be interim efficient. Interim efficiency
is obtained if and only if the type distribution has a linear inverse hazard rate. We
derive the symmetric equilibrium marginal contribution in that case. Beyond that non-
generic case, public intervention under the aegis of an uniformed mediator is helpful in
coordinating contributions. This points at the major inefficiency of contribution games
under asymmetric information and stands in sharp contrast with the striking positive
efficiency result that the common agency literature has unveiled when assuming complete
information.7
Extensions of the model address direct contracting and communication between prin-
cipals, the existence of pooling uninformative equilibria and the robustness of our findings
to the possibility that principals entertain more complex communication with their agent.
Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 shows how to
derive symmetric differentiable equilibria of the common agency game under asymmetric
information. We present there also the Lindahl-Samuelson conditions satisfied at equi-
librium and provide tractable examples. Section 5 discusses existence and uniqueness.
Section 6 analyzes welfare properties of equilibria. Section 7 discusses several extensions
of our model. Section 8 concludes. Proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
2 Review of the Literature
Following Wilson (1979) and Bernheim and Whinston (1986a), the common agency lit-
erature has developed an analytical framework to tackle a variety of important problems
such as menu auctions, public goods provision through voluntary contributions,8 or pol-
icy formation with competing lobbying groups in complete information environments.9
Imposing that contributions are “truthful”, i.e., reflect the relative preferences of the
5Laffont and Maskin (1982), Gu¨th and Hellwig (1987), Rob (1989) and Mailath and Postlewaite (1990).
6Holmstro¨m and Myerson (1983) and Ledyard and Palfrey (1999). Because the common agent might
get a positive rent in equilibrium from his endogenous private information, he might also receive a positive
weight in the social welfare function maximized by the uninformed mediator offering the centralized
mechanism designed to achieve a given interim efficient allocation.
7Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
8Laussel and Lebreton (1998).
9Grossman and Helpman (1994).
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principals among alternatives, Bernheim and Whinston (1986a) reduced the equilibrium
indeterminacy of those games and selected efficient equilibria.10 With such truthful sched-
ules, what a principal pays at the margin for inducing a change in the agent’s decision is
exactly what it is worth to him and the “free-riding” problem in public good provision
cannot arise. Modulo truthfulness, common agency aggregates preferences efficiently un-
der complete information.11 Modelling private information on the principals’ side justifies
the use of nonlinear contributions for screening purposes in the first place. The “truth-
fulness” requirement is then replaced by incentive compatibility constraints. The cost of
putting on firmer foundations the use of schedules is that ex post efficiency is lost and the
conditions for interim efficiency become severe. In sharp contrast with complete informa-
tion models, contribution games under asymmetric information are most often inefficient
even in the interim sense. This gives a less optimistic view of decentralized bargaining.
Paralleling those complete information papers, Stole (1991), Martimort (1992, 1996a,
1996b), Mezzetti (1997), Biais, Martimort and Rochet (2000) and Martimort and Stole
(2002, 2003, 2009) among others analyzed oligopolistic screening environments where
different principals elicit information privately known by the common agent at the con-
tracting stage. These papers stressed the impact of oligopolistic screening on the standard
rent/efficiency trade-off. We focus instead on asymmetric information on the principals’
side. Like in this earlier literature, the presence of competing principals introduces an
additional distortion. In the standard common agency literature, a given principal needs
to worry that the mechanism he offers affects the agent’s choices of the contracting vari-
ables controlled by other principals. The distortion channel in our paper is different.
Since principals cannot coordinate by communicating their types to a mediator, they
do so through the agent and endow the latter with private information that the agent
can exploit to obtain an information rent. The agent’s private information vis-a`-vis each
principal is endogenous: it is what the agent may have learned from observing the other
principals’ offers.12 The additional distortion due to the principals’ non-cooperative be-
havior can thus be explained by their desire to extract the information rent associated to
such endogenous information.
Contrasting with the use of schedules stressed by Bernheim and Whinston (1986), the
complete information literature on voluntary provision of public goods has highlighted
inefficiency and “free-riding” in models where contributors are restricted to offer fixed
contributions (Bergstrom, Blume and Varian, 1986). Other solutions to this inefficiency
problem include refunds (Bagnoli and Lipman, 1989) and multi-stage mechanisms in
10Multiplicity might still come from the flexibility in sharing the aggregate surplus among the con-
tributing principals and their common agent (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986a).
11These results have been extended in many different directions. Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997)
introduced redistributive concerns by relaxing the quasi-linearity assumption. Laussel and Lebreton
(1998) studied incomplete information on the preferences of the common agent but focused on ex ante
contracting when agency costs are null. Other extensions less directly relevant for the analysis of this
paper include Prat and Rustichini (2003) who studied competition among principals trying to influence
multiple agents and Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2003) who considered dynamic issues.
12Bond and Gresik (1997) studied the case where only one principal has private information and
principals compete with piece-rate contracts. They showed that there exists an open set of inefficient
equilibria. Bond and Gresik (1998) analyzed how tax authorities compete for a multinational firm’s
revenue when only one principal knows the firm’s costs. In both papers, decisions are on private goods.
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environments with partially verifiable information (Jackson and Moulin, 1992).
There exists a tiny literature on voluntary contributions for a 0-1 public good by
privately informed agents. These works derive equilibrium strategy using techniques from
the auction literature (Alboth, Lerner and Salev, 2001, Menezes, Monteiro and Temini,
2001). Menezes, Monteiro and Temini (2001) stressed the strong ex post inefficiency of
equilibria whereas Laussel and Palfrey (2003) and Barbieri and Malueg (2008a, 2008b)
found more positive results using interim efficiency. Our assumption that the level of
public good is continuous invites the use of a differentiable approach. Interim efficiency
is now much more stringent since it should apply not only on a line in the type space as
in the 0-1 case (namely the set of types for which there is indifference between producing
or not the public good) but on the whole type space. This is too demanding beyond the
case of linear inverse hazard rates.
Finally, it is also useful to situate our contribution within the existing mechanism de-
sign literature on public goods. Since Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973), it is well-known
that ex post efficiency is possible under dominant strategy implementation. D’Aspremont
and Gerard-Varet (1979) showed that one can maintain budget balance and efficiency un-
der Bayesian implementation. Laffont and Maskin (1982), Gu¨th and Hellwig (1987), Rob
(1989) and Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) stressed the role of participation constraints
to generate inefficiency. A game of voluntary contributions ensures participation by prin-
cipals, relies on Bayesian strategies, and finally generates a positive surplus for the agent.
Hence, ex post inefficiency necessarily arises. When a centralized mechanism is offered by
an uninformed mediator, inefficiencies are due to the contributors’ incentives to hide their
own types to this mediator: the so-called “free-riding” problem. Under common agency,
as we will see below, contributors reveal instead their types by offering contracts to the
agent but want to screen this agent according to what he has learned from others. This is
no longer contributors who underestimate their valuations but their common agent who
wants to claim to each principal that others have a lower willingness to pay: a different
source of inefficiency in public good provision.
3 The Model
Consider two risk-neutral principals Pi (i = 1, 2) who derive utility from consuming a
public good which is produced in non-negative quantity q.13,14 This public good may
be an infrastructure of variable size, a charitable activity, or it may also have a more
abstract interpretation as a policy variable in some lobbying games. The public good
is excludable so that non-contributors do not enjoy the public good. Pi gets a utility
Vi(θi, q, ti) = θiq − ti from consuming q units of the good and paying an amount ti.
Principals are privately informed on their respective valuations θi. Types are indepen-
13Extending our analysis to the case of more than two principals increases significantly complexity.
Indeed, we will see below that each principal designs his contribution to screen others’ types. Having
more than two principals leads thus to a difficult multidimensional screening problem when computing
each principal’s best response. We leave those issues for further research.
14The public good can also be produced in quantity 0 or 1 and q is then viewed as its variable quality.
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dently drawn from the same common knowledge and atomless distribution on Θ = [θ, θ¯]
(we denote ∆θ = θ¯ − θ > 0) with cumulative distribution function F (·) and everywhere
positive and differentiable density f = F ′. Unless specified otherwise, we assume that
θ > 0 and θ¯ <∞ with |f ′(θ)| being bounded.15 The inverse hazard rate R(θ) = 1−F (θ)
f(θ)
is
non-increasing. Eθ[·] denotes the expectation operator with respect to θ.
Contributions are collected by a risk-neutral common agent A who produces at cost
C(q) the public good and whose utility function is U(q,
∑2
i=1 ti) =
∑2
i=1 ti − C(q). C(·)
is twice differentiable and convex with C(0) = C ′(0) = 0 and C ′(∞) = ∞, where Inada
conditions avoid corner solutions.
Benchmark. Let qFB(θ1, θ2) be the first-best level of public good. It is increasing in
both arguments and satisfies the Lindahl-Samuelson conditions:
2∑
i=1
θi = C
′(qFB(θ1, θ2)).
Strategy space. Each principal Pi may offer any non-negative and continuous contribu-
tion schedule ti(·) defined on a compact interval Q = [0, Q¯] where Q¯ is large enough (say
larger than qFB(θ¯, θ¯)).
Timing. The sequence of events is as follows:
• Stage 0: Principals privately learn their types θi.
• Stage 1: Principals non-cooperatively and simultaneously offer the contributions {t1(·), t2(·)}.
• Stage 2: The agent accepts or refuses any of those contracts. If he refuses all contracts,
the game ends with zero payoff for all players.
• Stage 3: The agent produces the level of public good q. Payments are made according
to the agent’s acceptance decisions and the chosen level of public good.
Together with the principals’ preferences, the information structure, and strategy
spaces, this timing defines our common agency game under incomplete information Γ.
We consider pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) of Γ (in short equilibrium).
Let ti(·, θi) denote an equilibrium strategy followed by principal Pi when his type is θi.
Definition 1 A pair of strategy profiles {t1(·, θ1), t2(·, θ2)}(θ1,θ2)∈Θ2 is an equilibrium of Γ
if and only if:
• Principal Pi (i = 1, 2) with type θi finds it optimal to offer the contribution schedule
ti(·, θi) given that he expects that principal P−i follows the strategy profile {t−i(·, θ−i)}θ−i∈Θ;
• The agent’ updated beliefs on the principals’ types follow Bayes’ rule on the equilibrium
path and are arbitrary elsewhere;
• The agent accepts contributions and chooses optimally the level of public good given
those contributions and his beliefs on the principals’ types.
15Example 2 below provides an equilibrium characterization in the case of an exponential distribution.
Theorem 6 applies to beta-density that may be zero at θ¯.
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Because of symmetry between players, we will focus on symmetric equilibrium contri-
butions and we may sometimes omit subscripts when obvious.
Remark 1 Acceptance of all contributions is a weakly optimal strategy for the agent
given that those contributions are non-negative. Note that the restriction to non-negative
schedules is innocuous in this context. The agent would never choose an equilibrium output
on the range of transfers offered by a given principal which are negative. He would prefer
to refuse such schedule to increase his payoff.16
Remark 2 The strategy space that we consider allows principals to offer only contribution
schedules. We postpone to Section 7.3 the analysis of the case where principals may offer
more complex communication mechanisms in lines with the informed principal literature
(say menus of such contribution schedules from which they may pick one).17,18
Remark 3 Existence of an optimal output at Stage 3 follows from compactness of Q and
continuity of the schedules. In the sequel, we will impose further regularity assumptions
on contributions to get sharper predictions.
Remark 4 In any separating equilibrium, the agent infers from each principal’s contri-
bution his type. In such equilibrium, the agent gets endogenous private information on
both principals’ types before making his own choice on the level of public good.
Remark 5 At Stages 2 and 3 of the game, the agent’s decisions to accept and produce
depend only on the contribution schedules he receives. In our private values context where
the principals’ types do not enter directly into the agent’s utility function, these decisions
do not depend on the agent’s posterior beliefs following any offer made by one of the
principals either on or off the equilibrium path. Hence, out-of equilibrium beliefs that
sustain the equilibrium are arbitrary.19
4 Characterizing Equilibria
4.1 Overview
We proceed as follows to compute Pi’s best-response to a pure strategy profile {t−i(·, θ−i)}θ−i∈Θ
followed by P−i. First, we conjecture that P−i’s strategy is separating, i.e., P−i offers dif-
ferent contributions as his type changes. Our focus on separating equilibria is in the spirit
16In Section 7.3 we allow for negative transfers when principals offer inscrutable menus of mechanisms
(i.e., menus of contributions schedules that do not reveal the principal’s type) that are accepted or refused
by the agent before he produces and the principals reveal their types. Ex post participation constraints
are then replaced by interim ones and, in that case, it becomes quite natural to allow for transfers being
possibly negative in some states of nature.
17Maskin and Tirole (1990, 1992) and Myerson (1983) among others.
18There is no cheap talk stage between players that could help them to replicate the existence of a
mediator (Barany, 1992, Forges, 1990, Gerardi, 2002).
19See the Appendix for details.
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of looking at equilibrium allocations that are informative as in Spence (1973) and Riley
(1979).20 Before choosing the level of public good, the agent gets thus endogenous private
information on θ−i by simply observing the mere offer t−i(·, θ−i) he receives. Pi must
thus design his own contribution with an eye on the information rent that the agent gets
from this endogenous information.21 Second, we first do as if the agent was perfectly
informed on Pi’s type when the latter chooses his best response to the strategy profile
{t−i(q, θ−i)}θ−i∈Θ followed by P−i in a pure strategy equilibrium. Third, we benefit of
the private values environment (i.e., the principals’ types do not enter directly into the
agent’s utility function) to show that the corresponding profile of contribution schedules
is also a best response in the asymmetric information game Γ. Deviating towards another
contribution schedule is suboptimal for any out-of equilibrium beliefs that the agent may
hold following such unexpected offer. Finally, we notice that Pi’s best response is itself
separating and conveys information on Pi’s type to the agent. Therefore, the agent gets
endogenous private information on Pi’s type also by simply observing his mere offer. This
justifies that the same techniques can be used to compute also P−i’s best response so that
this approach holds the symmetric equilibrium we are looking for.
Running Example. To illustrate the above procedure, we will use throughout the
quadratic-uniform example, i.e., C(q) = q
2
2
and types are uniformly distributed on Θ =
[θ, θ¯] with 3θ > θ¯.
4.2 Computing Best Responses
Following the procedure explained above, we assume that the agent is perfectly in-
formed on the Pi ’s type when the latter chooses his best response to the strategy profile
{t−i(q, θ−i)}θ−i∈Θ followed by P−i. The Revelation Principle can be used to characterize
any allocation that principal Pi may achieve by deviating towards any possible contribu-
tion schedule ti(q, θi).
22 We thus focus on revelation mechanisms {tDi (θˆ−i|θi), qD(θˆ−i|θi)}θˆ−i∈Θ
inducing the agent to reveal to Pi what he has learned by observing P−i’s offer.
Let θˆ−i be the agent’s report on θ−i (that he has learned from observing P−i’s offer)
to Pi in the truthful and direct revelation mechanism above. The agent’s utility becomes:
U˜D(θˆ−i, θ−i|θi) = tDi (θˆ−i|θi) + t−i(qD(θˆ−i|θi), θ−i)− C(qD(θˆ−i|θi)).
Incentive compatibility yields the expression of the agent’s information rent:
UD(θ−i|θi) = U˜D(θ−i, θ−i|θi) = max
θˆ−i∈Θ
U˜D(θˆ−i, θ−i|θi). (1)
For a fixed strategy profile {t−i(q, θ−i)}θ−i∈Θ for P−i, the mechanism {tDi (θˆ−i|θi), qD(θˆ−i|θi)}θˆ−i∈Θ
induces the allocation {UD(θ−i|θi), qD(θ−i|θi)}θ−i∈Θ.
20Such equilibria aggregates information efficiently which seems to be an interesting normative property,
especially in view of assessing the ex post efficiency of equilibrium allocations. Section 7.2 analyzes instead
the case of uninformative pooling equilibria.
21This points at the role that contributions play in a common agency environment: learning over what
Epstein and Peters (1999) call “market information”, i.e., over other principals’ preferences that are
reflected in their own offers to the agent.
22Martimort and Stole (2002).
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Making Pi’s endogenous screening problem about learning P−i’s type from the agent
tractable requires further conditions on P−i’s contributions. The conditions below will
thus be satisfied by the informative equilibrium under scrutiny. To simplify the analy-
sis, we are now also considering contribution schedules which are piecewise three times
differentiable so that the equilibrium output is differentiable.23
Definition 2 A non-negative contribution t−i(q, θ−i) is increasing in type (IT) when, at
any differentiability point (q, θ−i),
∂t−i
∂θ
(q, θ−i) ≥ 0.
Under IT, principal P−i contributes more if he has a greater valuation. Another natural
requirement is that an upward shift in P−i’s valuation increases also the equilibrium
quantity, i.e., the same Spence-Mirrlees property as for the principals’ preferences holds
also for the contribution schedules.
Definition 3 A non-negative contribution t−i(q, θ−i) with margin p−i(q, θ−i) =
∂t−i
∂q
(q, θ−i)
satisfies the Spence-Mirrlees Property (SMP) when, at any differentiability point (q, θ−i),
∂p−i
∂θ
(q, θ−i) ≥ 0.
Using standard techniques from the screening literature in monopolistic screening environ-
ments, the next lemma characterizes incentive compatible allocations that Pi may induce
by choosing his own contribution schedule.
Lemma 1 Assume that P−i offers a non-negative contribution t−i(q, θ−i). Any truthful
and direct revelation mechanism {tDi (θˆ−i|θi), qD(θˆ−i|θi)}θˆ−i∈Θ that Pi may offer to induce
the allocation {UD(θ−i|θi), qD(θ−i|θi)}θ−i∈Θ satisfies the following properties:
• UD(θ−i|θi) is a.e. differentiable with respect to θ−i with
∂UD
∂θ−i
(θ−i|θi) = ∂t−i
∂θ
(qD(θ−i|θi), θ−i) ≥ 0 (2)
when t−i(q, θ−i) satisfies IT;
• If t−i(q, θ−i) satisfies SMP, qD(θ−i|θi) is monotonically increasing and thus a.e. differ-
entiable in θ−i with
∂qD
∂θ−i
(θ−i|θi) ≥ 0 a.e..; (3)
• If t−i(q, θ−i) satisfies SMP, (3) is also sufficient for global optimality of the agent’s
problem (1).
23Equilibria using forcing contributions can be constructed in this environment. See Section 7.2.
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Running Example (cont.). Suppose that principal P2 with type θ2 offers the following
revealing non-negative contribution:
t2(q, θ2) = max
{
0,
(
θ2
2
− θ¯
6
)
q +
q2
6
+ t02(θ2)
}
(4)
where
t02(θ2) =
1
12
(3θ − θ¯)2 − 1
6
(
3
2
(θ2 + θ)− θ¯
)2
.
Notice that, on its positive range, t2(q, θ2) satisfies IT when q ≥ −2 dt
0
2
dθ2
(θ2) =
3
2
(θ2+θ)− θ¯
a property that holds for the equilibrium output given in (6) below. It also satisfies SMP.
Turning now to participation constraints, the agent accepts Pi’s offer when:
UD(θ−i|θi) ≥ Uˆ−i(θ−i), for all θ−i ∈ Θ (5)
where Uˆ−i(θ−i) = max
q∈Q
t−i(q, θ−i) − C(q) is the agent’s rent when not taking Pi’s con-
tribution. Since t−i(q, θ−i) is non-negative, the agent makes necessarily a non-negative
profit at any profile (θi, θ−i).
Running Example (cont.). By taking only the contribution schedule defined in (4),
the agent gets a reservation payoff
Uˆ2(θ2) = max
q≥0
t2(q, θ2)− q
2
2
= max
{
0,
1
48
(3θ2 − θ¯)2 + t02(θ2)
}
where the second-term in the right-hand side above is achieved by choosing the non-
negative output qˆ2(θ2) =
1
4
(3θ2 − θ¯) on the positive range of t2(q, θ2).
If the agent were informed on Pi’s type θi, principal Pi would solve the following
mechanism design problem at a best-response to any non-negative SMP profile t−i(q, θ−i):
Pi(θi) : max{UD(·|θi);qD(·|θi)}Eθ−i
[
θiq
D(θ−i|θi) + t−i(qD(θ−i|θi), θ−i)− C(qD(θ−i|θi))− UD(θ−i|θi)
]
subject to (2), (3), and (5).
A solution to Pi(θi) is an allocation {UD(θ−i|θi), qD(θ−i|θi)} (or, equivalently, a direct
revelation mechanism {tDi (θ−i|θi), qD(θ−i|θi)} that induces this allocation)24 from which
we can easily reconstruct the nonlinear contribution ti(q, θi) offered by Pi with the simple
formula ti(q, θi) = t
D
i (θ−i|θi) at q = qD(θ−i|θi).25
The standard techniques for solving problems like Pi(θi) in monopolistic screening
environments consist in first neglecting the second-order condition (3), second assuming
that the participation constraint (5) binds only at θi = θ to obtain an expression of the
24To simplify notations, the dependence on t−i(q, θ−i) is implicit.
25This formula holds whether qD(θ−i|θi) is strictly increasing in θ−i or has flat parts on bunching areas
if any.
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agent’s rent UD(θ−i|θi), third integrating by parts the expected rent left to the agent to
get an expression of the principal’s virtual surplus function.
As shown in the Appendix, these first three steps of the analysis lead to the following
reduced-form problem P ′i(θi):
P ′i(θi) : max
qD(·|θi)
Eθ−i
[
θiq
D(θ−i|θi) + t−i(qD(θ−i|θi), θ−i)− C(qD(θ−i|θi))−R(θ−i)∂t−i
∂θ
(qD(θ−i|θi), θ−i)
]
.
A first difficulty is that the concavity of Pi’s virtual surplus function in the maximand
above depends on the other principal’s offer t−i(q, θ−i) which is an equilibrium construc-
tion. A second difficulty comes from checking that the second-order condition (3) holds. It
turns out that both difficulties can be handled together when t−i(q, θ−i) satisfies a couple
of properties that are made explicit in condition (12) below.
Running Example (cont.). Let us find principal P1’s best response to t2(q, θ2) and
assume that his type is revealed through the contract offer to the agent. As we saw
above, such best response can be computed by means of a direct revelation mechanism
{tD1 (θˆ2|θ1), qD(θˆ2|θ1)}θˆ2∈Θ.
Using standard techniques, let us thus write the agent’s payoff when taking both
schedules as:
UD(θ2|θ1) = max
θˆ2∈Θ
tD1 (θˆ2|θ1) + t2(qD(θˆ2|θ1), θ2)−
1
2
(qD(θˆ2|θ1))2.
The equilibrium output being chosen on the positive range of t2(q, θ2), we immediately
get from the Envelope Theorem:
∂UD
∂θ2
(θ2|θ1) = ∂t2
∂θ2
(qD(θ2|θ1), θ2) = 1
2
qD(θ2|θ1) ≥ 0.
A key point for finding P1’s best response consists in determining where the participation
constraint necessary to induce the agent’s acceptance of principal P1’s contribution binds.
Note that Uˆ2(θ) = 0 and that the slope of Uˆ2(θ2) is lower than the slope of U
D(θ2|θ1)
provided principal P1’s marginal contribution is positive and induces more production
than when the agent contracts only with principal P2. This yields immediately:
UD(θ2|θ1) =
∫ θ2
θ
1
2
qD(x|θ1)dx.
When using the direct revelation mechanism {tD1 (θˆ2|θ1), qD(θˆ2|θ1)}θˆ2∈Θ, principal P1’s ex-
pected payoff becomes:
Eθ2
[
θ1q
D(θ2|θ1) + t2(qD(θ2|θ1))− 1
2
(qD(θ2|θ1))2 − UD(θ2|θ1)
]
= Eθ2
[(
θ1 + θ2 − θ¯
3
)
qD(θ2|θ1)− 1
3
(qD(θ2|θ1))2 − t02(θ2)
]
where the equality follows from using Eθ2
[
UD(θ2|θ1)
]
= Eθ2
[
(θ¯−θ2)
2
qD(θ2|θ1)
]
.
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Pointwise optimization of P1’s virtual surplus yields the following expression of the
output induced at a best response to t2(q, θ2):
q(θ1, θ2) =
3
2
(θ1 + θ2)− θ¯. (6)
Moreover, P1’s marginal contribution at a best response is such that:
∂t1
∂q
(q(θ1, θ2), θ1) = q(θ1, θ2)− ∂t2
∂q
(q(θ1, θ2), θ1) =
θ1
2
− θ¯
6
+
q(θ1, θ2)
3
≥ 0 when 3θ > θ¯
and where the second equality follows from using the expression of t2(q, θ2) given in (4)
on its positive range. Integrating yields the following expression of P1’s contribution for
any output in its positive range:
t1(q, θ1) =
(
θ1
2
− θ¯
6
)
q +
q2
6
+ t01(θ1) (7)
where
t01(θ1) =
1
12
(3θ − θ¯)2 − 1
6
(
3
2
(θ1 + θ)− θ¯
)2
is chosen so that UD(θ|θ1) = 0 for all θ1.26 The contribution can finally be extended
beyond the set of equilibrium outputs as in (4). A pair of such schedules forms thus a
symmetric informative equilibrium in this quadratic-uniform example.
The next subsection offers a general analysis of such equilibria.
4.3 Symmetric Informative Equilibria
Consider symmetric equilibria which solve problems Pi(θi) (or P ′i(θi)) for both principals.
An important step of our analysis below will consist in showing that the contribution
schedule solution to Pi(θi) which was derived assuming that the agent has complete in-
formation on Pi’s type is also a best-response in Γ, i.e., when Pi is privately informed.
Indeed, note that the incentive and participation constraints (2), (3), and (5) do not de-
pend on the agent’s beliefs on Pi’s type but only on the schedule that this principal offers.
Hence, the agent’s decisions to accept that contribution and to produce accordingly are
also independent on his beliefs on Pi’s type. Any deviation away from the contribution
that Pi would optimally offer had the agent being informed on his type is thus dominated
for any out-of equilibrium beliefs.
At a symmetric informative equilibrium with contribution t(q, θ) (resp. marginal con-
tribution p(q, θ)) satisfying SMP, we denote respectively the agent’s output and rent as
qD(θ−i|θi) = qD(θi|θ−i) = q(θ1, θ2) and UD(θ−i|θi) = UD(θi|θ−i) = U(θ1, θ2). The first-
order condition for pointwise optimization of P ′i(θi) is:
θi + p(q(θ1, θ2), θ−i)− C ′(q(θ1, θ2)) = R(θ−i)∂p
∂θ
(q(θ1, θ2), θ−i) for i = 1, 2. (8)
26Notice that ∂t1∂θ1 ≥ 0 if q ≥ −2
dt01
dθ1
(θ1) = 32 (θ1 + θ) − θ¯ as it will be the case for the output found in
(6). This expression is symmetric of that obtained for t02(θ2).
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This is the standard condition in screening model which says that the marginal surplus
of the bilateral coalition between Pi and the agent (left-hand side of (8)) is equal to the
marginal cost of the latter’s information rent (right-hand side of (8)). The difficulty comes
from the fact that the marginal contribution p(q, θ) is an equilibrium construction.
To complete the characterization of equilibrium marginal contributions, it is useful
to rewrite the optimality condition for the agent’s output given that he has accepted
both contributions. This output must, on top of (8), also satisfy the following first-order
condition of the agent’s problem expressed in terms on nonlinear contributions:
2∑
i=1
p(q(θ1, θ2), θi) = C
′(q(θ1, θ2)), (9)
with the second-order condition
2∑
i=1
∂p
∂q
(q(θ1, θ2), θi)− C ′′(q(θ1, θ2)) ≤ 0. (10)
Consider now an equilibrium output q(θ1, θ2) increasing in each argument. For any given
level of the public good q = q(θ1, θ2), we can uniquely define the conjugate of type θi as
the type ψ(q, θi) for principal P−i such that q(θi, ψ(q, θi)) = q. Using conditions (8) and
(9), ψ(q, θ) must be defined as:
ψ(q, θ) = −p(q, θ) + C ′(q) +R(θ)∂p
∂θ
(q, θ), ∀(q, θ). (11)
From now on, we will assume that
∂ψ
∂q
(q, θ) > 0 and
∂ψ
∂θ
(q, θ) < 0. (12)
These assumptions bear on an endogenous object, namely the equilibrium marginal con-
tribution, but they allow a clear characterization of equilibrium properties.
Running Example (cont.). Going back on formula (6), we easily observe that ψ(q, θ) =
2
3
(θ¯ + q)− θ satisfies conditions (12).
Theorem 1 A non-negative marginal contribution p(q, θ) arising at a symmetric infor-
mative equilibrium of Γ and satisfying 27 IT, SMP and (12) implements an output schedule
q(θ1, θ2) which is increasing in each argument and satisfies conditions (8), (9) and (10).
Such equilibrium is separating and sustained by arbitrary out-of equilibrium beliefs.
Turning now to the output distortions and distributions of information rent in any
such symmetric informative equilibrium, we obtain:
27From now on, an informative equilibrium satisfying IT and SMP will be called an equilibrium in
short.
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Theorem 2 Any symmetric informative equilibrium with a marginal contribution p(q, θ)
satisfying (12) implements an output schedule q(·) and a rent profile U(·) such that:
• Efficiency arises when both principals have the highest valuation (q(θ¯, θ¯) = qFB(θ¯, θ¯))
and output is downward distorted otherwise (q(θ1, θ2) ≤ qFB(θ1, θ2) for all (θ1, θ2));
• The agent’s information rent is such that
U(θ1, θ2) ≥ 0 with equality if θi = θ for at least one i
where also
∂U
∂θi
(θi, θ) =
∂t
∂θ
(q(θi, θ), θi) = 0 for all θi. (13)
At a best response, a principal induces less output from the agent than what is ex post
efficient for their bilateral coalition. This downward distortion reduces the information
rent that the agent gets from his endogenous private knowledge on the other principal’s
type. This distortion is captured by the right-hand side of (8) which is positive thanks to
SMP. In this common agency game, inefficiency comes from the screening problem that
each principal faces in contracting with an agent who is endogenously privately informed
on the other principal’s type.
This downward distortion should be contrasted with the usual “free-riding” prob-
lem for public good provision found in centralized Bayesian mechanisms (Laffont and
Maskin, 1979, Rob, 1989, Mailath and Postlewaite, 1990). Free-riding comes there from
the contributors’ incentives to underestimate their valuations when reporting to a single
mechanism designer. Under common agency instead, principals do not hide their own
valuations to the common agent but each of these principals wants to screen the agent
about the other principal’s preferences. These are no longer contributors themselves who
hide information but the agent who might pretend having received less contributions from
each principal than what he really had.
Finally, the agent’s rent is everywhere non-negative and zero when at least one of the
principals has the lowest possible valuation. The equilibrium allocation is generally not
budget balanced, and may generate some surplus that accrues to the agent.
4.4 Lindahl-Samuelson Conditions and Tractable Examples
From condition (11) we have:
ψ(q, θi) + p(q, θi)− C ′(q) = R(θi)∂p
∂θ
(q, θi), (14)
for all q = q(θi, θ−i) and (θi, θ−i) ∈ Θ2. This condition can be rewritten as:
∂
∂θi
[p(q, θi)(1− F (θi))] = (ψ(q, θi)− C ′(q))f(θi).
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This differential equation in θi can be integrated to get p(q, θi). Since p(q, θi) must remain
bounded around θi = θ¯ for all q, we obtain:
p(q, θi) = C
′(q)− 1
1− F (θi)
∫ θ¯
θi
ψ(q, x)f(x)dx. (15)
Taking into account this expression of the marginal contributions and using (9) yield the
following modified Lindahl-Samuelson conditions:
C ′(q(θ1, θ2)) =
2∑
i=1
1
1− F (θi)
∫ θ¯
θi
ψ(q(θ1, θ2), x)f(x)dx. (16)
Conditions (15) and (16) might sometimes suffice to characterize the marginal contribution
and output at an equilibrium.
Example 1. Let us extend our Running Example. Assume that the principals’ types
are still independently and uniformly distributed on Θ = [θ, θ¯]. The following marginal
contribution which is linear in type and satisfies SMP is part of a symmetric equilibrium:
p(q, θ) =
θ
2
− θ¯
6
+
C ′(q)
3
.
One can check that condition (8) holds so that this is a best-response for each principal
to offer such a marginal contribution given that the other principal also does so.
The equilibrium output satisfies
C ′(q(θ1, θ2)) =
3
2
(θ1 + θ2)− θ¯, (17)
and thus ψ(q, θ) = 2
3
(θ¯ + C ′(q)) − θ (with ∂ψ
∂q
(q, θ) > 0 and ∂ψ
∂θ
(q, θ) < 0). Marginal
contributions are always positive for any equilibrium output when ∆θ is small enough,
namely 3θ > θ¯.
Example 2. Consider an exponential distribution on the unbounded support Θ =
[θ,+∞), with 1 − F (θ) = exp (−r(θ − θ)), r > 0 and θ > 1
r
. Looking again for a
symmetric equilibrium with a marginal contribution which is linear in type and satisfies
SMP, we find:
p(q, θ) = θ − 1
r
.
Again (8) holds and the non-negative equilibrium output is such that
C ′(q(θ1, θ2)) = θ1 + θ2 − 2
r
, (18)
so that ψ(q, θ) = 2
r
+ C ′(q) − θ (with again ∂ψ
∂q
(q, θ) > 0 and ∂ψ
∂θ
(q, θ) < 0). Marginal
contributions are always positive for any equilibrium output since θ > 1
r
.
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5 Existence and Uniqueness
To get further insights on the structure of equilibria, it is useful to describe an equilibrium
in terms of its isoquant lines θ2 = ψ(q, θ1). Rewriting conditions (8) and (9) along such
isoquant yields:
p(q, θ) + p(q, ψ(q, θ)) = C ′(q), (19)
ψ(q, θ)− p(q, ψ(q, θ)) = R(θ)∂p
∂θ
(q, θ), (20)
for all (q, θ), where q is in the range of the equilibrium schedule of outputs q(·).28
For a distribution with finite support, positive density and having |f ′(θ)| bounded,
those two equations are already quite informative on the shape of the marginal contribu-
tion at its boundaries on any isoquant. For any q such that 2θ¯ ≥ C ′(q) ≥ θ¯ + θ − 1
2f(θ)
,
the highest type on the q-isoquant is θ¯ whereas the lowest type θ(q) ≥ θ is increasing in
q. We show in the Appendix (Lemma 6) that marginal contributions at those boundaries
satisfy:
p(q, θ(q)) = θ(q),
∂p
∂θ
(q, θ(q)) =
1
2
, p(q, θ¯) = C ′(q)− θ(q) < θ¯ and ∂p
∂θ
(q, θ¯) > 0.
Solving for (19) and (20) at a fixed q means looking for a function x(θ) = p(q, θ)
increasing in θ (and thus invertible) on a domain [θ(q), θ¯] which satisfies the following
non-standard functional equation:
R(θ)x˙(θ)− x(θ) + C ′(q) = x−1(C ′(q)− x(θ)) (21)
with the boundary conditions29
x(θ(q)) = θ(q) and x(θ¯) = C ′(q)− θ(q). (22)
(21) is not a standard differential equation since it depends not only on the function
and its (non-negative) derivative but also on its inverse. Standard results do not apply to
guarantee existence and uniqueness of such a solution. Moreover, the boundary conditions
(22) are such that (21) has a singularity at θ¯. Hence, the analysis needed to prove existence
has to rely on a global approach. In this respect, a more tractable way to prove existence
is to work with the equilibrium distribution of marginal prices.30 Doing so turns out also
to provide new intuition on how each principal computes his best response.
Fix q and denote by G(p, q) the cumulative distribution of marginal price p(q, θ) on
that isoquant, i.e., G(p, q) = Pr[p(q, θ) ≤ p]. Since we are interested in deriving equilibria
28Notice that, by definition of a conjugate type, it must also be that ψ(q, ψ(q, θ)) = θ, for all θ ∈ [θ, θ].
29We focus on the case 2θ¯ ≥ C ′(q) ≥ θ¯+θ− 12f(θ) , i.e., outputs close enough to the first-best when both
principals have the highest valuation since it appears to be the most interesting case. Lower output levels
correspond to less stringent boundary conditions which are thus less constraining for the equilibrium
characterization.
30A similar trick is used by Leininger, Linhart and Radner (1989) for double auctions and Wilson
(1993) for nonlinear pricing.
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with strictly increasing marginal contribution, G(p, q) has no atom. Denote then by
g(p, q) = ∂G
∂p
(p, q) the corresponding density. A priory, only agents with type θ ≥ θ(q)
may lie on that isoquant q and the boundary conditions (22) tell us that the range of prices
p(q, θ) must be [θ(q), C ′(q)−θ(q)]. By the monotonicity of p(θ, q), we have G(p(q, θ), q) =
F (θ) and g(p(q, θ))∂p
∂θ
(q, θ) = f(θ) and we may extend G(p, q) for p ∈ [θ, θ(q)] with the
convention that types θ ≤ θ(q) contribute at the margin their valuation, i.e., p(q, θ) = θ.
The equilibrium condition (21) can be rewritten using the definition of G(·, q) as
F
(
C ′(q)− p+ 1−G(p, q)
g(p, q)
)
= G(C ′(q)− p, q).
From this, we obtain the following functional equation:
∂G
∂p
(p, q)
1−G(p, q) =
1
F−1(G(C ′(q)− p, q))− C ′(q) + p. (23)
The boundary conditions (22) yield
G(θ(q), q) = F (θ(q)) and G(C ′(q)− θ(q), q) = 1. (24)
The next theorem provides our existence result. For this we need the following tech-
nical assumption on the hazard function:31
min
θ∈Θ
θ +R(θ) = θ¯. (25)
Theorem 3 Assume that (25) holds. A solution G(p, q) to the system (23)-(24) (or
alternatively a solution p(q, θ) to (21)-(22)) exists. This solution G(p, q) (resp. p(q, θ)) is
increasing in p (resp. θ).
It is instructive to sketch the proof of Theorem 3. The first step is to consider the
sequence of distributions of marginal contributions that each principal plays in turn at a
best response to what the other offers starting from the simple case where one principal,
say P1, would myopically offer a marginal contribution always equal to his own valuation.
Under the weak condition (25), principal P2 reacts by himself offering a distribution which,
at each iteration, dominates in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance that offered at
the round before. For P1, this is the reverse; each iterate is dominated by the previous one.
Intuitively, a principal finds it worth to offer higher marginal contributions if the other
offers lower contributions and vice-versa; the best-response mapping is monotonically
31Since R(θ) = 0 and R′(θ) = −1, it is straightforward that the convexity of the hazard function
guarantees (25). Another sufficient condition is the log-concavity of the density. Notice that R′(θ) =
−1 − R(θ) ddθ (ln(f(θ))) and R′′(θ) = −R′(θ) ddθ (ln(f(θ))) − R(θ) d
2
dθ2 (ln(f(θ))) which imply that every
critical point θ∗ < θ¯ of the minimization problem (25) is such that ddθ (ln(f(θ))) |θ=θ∗ = 0. Thus,
R′′(θ∗) = −R(θ∗) d2dθ2 (ln(f(θ))) |θ=θ∗ ≥ 0 whenever ln(f(θ)) is a concave function. Therefore, every
critical point is a local minimum which implies that θ = θ is the unique minimum. It is straightforward
to check that uniform, and normal or exponential distributions restricted to finite supports satisfy log-
concavity of the density.
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decreasing. This iterative process converges towards a set of distributions which is stable
in the following sense: if any principal offers a distribution of marginal prices from this set,
the other principal’s best response lies also in it. Schauder’s Second Theorem32 guarantees
then existence of a distribution in that stable set which is a fixed-point.
Theorem 3 gives us the existence of a solution p(q, θ) to (21) for a given isoquant q. We
must also check that, as q increases, the corresponding ψ(q, θ) derived from the knowledge
of p(q, θ) increases in q to ensure concavity of the principals’ problems as requested by
Theorem 1. Using that ψ(q, θ(q)) = θ¯ in any equilibrium and differentiating with respect
to q yields ∂ψ
∂q
(q, θ) > 0 in the neighborhood of θ(q). Hence, concavity holds when ∆θ is
small enough. The monotonicity of output follows from Theorem 2.
We have been silent so far about uniqueness. In this respect, we have:
Theorem 4 Assume that types are uniformly distributed, then the solution to the system
(23)-(24) is unique.
This result is of some importance for what follows. In the case of a uniform distribu-
tion, the unique separating equilibrium is given by (17) and, anticipating on Theorem 6
below, it is interim efficient.
With an unbounded support however, θ(q) is not properly defined, and there is no
boundary condition that must be satisfied by the price schedule at θ¯ = +∞. This inde-
terminacy opens the door to a multiplicity of equilibria as shown by the example below.
Example 2 (cont.). Assume that types are distributed according to an exponential
distribution F (θ) = 1 − exp(−r(θ − θ)) on [θ,∞) with θ > 1/r. There exists a whole
continuum of equilibria p(q, θ) which solve (21). Those equilibria are such that p(q, θ) <
θ−1/r. Inefficiencies in any of those equilibria are stronger than in the equilibrium where
p(q, θ) = θ − 1/r that we already exhibited above.33
6 Welfare Properties
6.1 Ex Post Inefficiency
The following necessary implementability condition makes it easy to check whether a
given output schedule cannot be implemented as a common agency equilibrium.
Lemma 2 Any equilibrium output q(·) must satisfy:
E(θ1,θ2)
[(
2∑
i=1
θi −R(θi)
)
q(θ1, θ2)− C(q(θ1, θ2))
]
≥ 2θq(θ, θ)− C(q(θ, θ)) > 0. (26)
32Burton (2005, Chapter 3).
33See the proof in the Appendix.
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Condition (26) says that the expected virtual surplus (where marginal valuations θi are
replaced by their virtual values θi − R(θi)) is worth at least the whole surplus gener-
ated in the worst scenario where both principals have the lowest type. This is similar
to the standard feasibility condition that arises in asymmetric information models with
independent types once Bayesian incentive compatibility, ex post budget balanced and
individual rationality constraints are aggregated altogether.34 In the contexts used so far
in this literature, there is no restriction in the centralized mechanisms that an uninformed
mediator can use to implement an allocation and this condition turns out to be also suffi-
cient: Given any output schedule satisfying the implementability condition, one can find
transfers which are ex post budget-balanced, Bayesian incentive compatible and individ-
ual rational for the informed players. Here, the added requirement is that the allocation
should arise as the equilibrium of a common agency game and budget balance is replaced
by the weaker requirement that the agent’s information rent is non-negative. Condition
(26) is here no longer sufficient for implementation as a common agency equilibrium.
Indeed, such an allocation must also solve the functional equation (16).
Nevertheless, the necessary condition (26) is enough to get sharp results. Indeed, Ex-
amples 1 and 2 above already showed existence of ex post inefficient equilibria. Equipped
with condition (26), it is straightforward to check that ex post inefficiency always arises.
Theorem 5 The first-best output qFB(θ1, θ2) never satisfies condition (26) and thus can-
not be achieved at any common agency equilibrium under asymmetric information.
This result echoes the discussion after Theorem 2 but it sharpens it. Equipped with
Theorems 2 and 5, we can conclude that there is always some downward distortion of the
equilibrium output below the first-best for at least a set of types with non-zero measure.
This contrasts sharply with the case of complete information where common agency games
have efficient equilibria sustained with “truthful” schedules.
6.2 Interim Inefficiency
Under asymmetric information, one can still be interested in the normative properties of
common agency equilibria provided that interim efficiency is used as the welfare criterion.
We now investigate under which circumstances an equilibrium might be interim efficient.
Interim efficient allocations are obtained as solutions of a centralized mechanism de-
sign problem.35 An uninformed mediator offers a centralized mechanism to both princi-
pals, who then report their types to this mediator. This mediator maximizes a weighted
sum of the principals’ and the agent’s utilities with the weights given to different types
of principals being possibly different. Because we want to replicate with such central-
ized mechanism a symmetric common agency equilibrium, we consider symmetric weights
which do not depend on the principal’s identity.
34Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) developed such condition for the case of bargaining, whereas
Laffont and Maskin (1982), Gu¨th and Hellwig (1987), Mailath and Postlewaite (1990), Ledyard and
Palfrey (1999), and Hellwig (2003) did so for the case of public goods.
35Holmstro¨m and Myerson (1983).
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Lemma 3 An interim efficient profile q(θ1, θ2) non-decreasing in each argument (resp.
increasing) is such that there exist positive social weights α(θ) > 036 such that
∫ θ¯
θ
α(θ)f(θ)dθ ≤
137 and
2∑
i=1
b(θi) = C
′(q(θ1, θ2)) (27)
where b(θi) = θi −R(θi)(1− α˜(θi)) is non-decreasing (resp. increasing) in θi and α˜(θi) =
1
1−F (θi)
∫ θ¯
θi
α(x)f(x)dx.
Equation (27) is again a Lindhal-Samuelson condition under asymmetric information
where valuations are replaced by virtual valuations reflecting the weights that different
types have in the social welfare function that is maximized by the uninformed mediator
in charge of finding such interim efficient allocation.
Examples 1 and 2 (cont.). For a uniform distribution having support Θ = [θ, θ¯], the
solution found in (17) remains interim efficient with the uniform weight α(θ) = 1
2
for all
θ. Even though the type distribution has unbounded support, positive results can also be
found for Example 2 with the uniform weight α(θ) = 0, i.e., principals have no weight in
the social welfare objective maximized by the uninformed mediator.
Altogether (16) and (27) show that any increasing candidate function b(·) must solve
the following functional equation:
2∑
i=1
b(θi) =
2∑
i=1
1
1− F (θi)
∫ θ¯
θi
b−1(b(θ1) + b(θ2)− b(x))f(x)dx ∀(θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ2. (28)
This condition is rather stringent. As a result, it is not surprising that there are few
candidates for such b(·) and F (·) functions that altogether ensure interim efficiency.
Theorem 6 A symmetric equilibrium of a common agency game is interim efficient if
and only if the inverse hazard rate R(θ) is linear.
Theorem 6 implies that the only possibility for interim efficiency in the case of distri-
butions having finite support arises with the β-density function f(θ) = 1+β
∆θ1+β
(θ− θ)β (for
β ≥ 0).38 The function b(·) is then linear (b(θ) = (β+3)θ−θ¯
β+2
), isoquants have slope -1 in the
36We focus on the case where all types receive a positive social weight in the social welfare criterion.
Without this assumption, we would get the unpalatable conclusion that giving only a Dirac mass to types
θ¯ trivially achieves efficiency since the equilibrium output has no distortion at the top. Also, given that
we focused above in separating equilibria with strictly monotonically increasing allocations as described
in Theorem 1, we restrict to social weights that induce monotonically increasing allocations as well.
37This inequality captures the possibility that the common agent receives a positive weight in the social
welfare function maximized by the uninformed mediator. Remember that Theorem 2 shows that, in any
common agency symmetric equilibrium, the agent gets a non-negative ex post rent U(θ1, θ2) which should
be accounted for when evaluating welfare. This distinguishes our notion of interim efficiency from that
used when it is assumed that budget is always balanced ex post (as in Ledyard and Palfrey, 1999).
38Note that f(θ¯) = 0 for that density so that Lemma 6 does not apply. In particular, ∂
2p
∂q∂θ (q, θ) 6= 12
for β > 0.
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(θ1, θ2) space, and social weights are uniform (α(θ) =
1
β+2
). Marginal contributions are
linear in type and positive for ∆θ small enough:
p(q, θ) =
C ′(q)
β + 3
+ θ¯
(
β + 1
β + 3
)
− (θ¯ − θ)
(
β + 1
β + 2
)
.
The derivative ∂p
∂θ
(q, θ) = β+1
β+2
> 0 is independent of type and output. This is the SMP
term that determines the distortions induced by each principal at a best response. When
it is constant, each principal induces a distortion which does not depend on the other’s
type. This reduces the scope for manipulations by the agent and ensures interim efficiency.
An immediate corollary of Theorem 6 follows.
Theorem 7 Public intervention through an uninformed mediator improves on the equi-
librium outcome unless the inverse hazard rate R(θ) is linear.
Although the common agency institution implements an interim efficient allocation for
linear inverse hazard rates, beyond that case, players strictly gain from appealing to an
uninformed mediator to collect contributions and move the outcome towards the interim
efficiency frontier with a centralized mechanism.
This is an important insight. Contribution games under asymmetric information are
unlikely to be efficient even in the weaker sense of interim efficiency. Beyond the linear
inverse hazard rate case, those games entail too much screening with each principal trying
to learn the other’s type through the agent compared to a more centralized design with an
uninformed mediator collecting direct messages from the privately informed principals.
7 Discussion
This section investigates a few extensions of our basic framework and discusses some
modeling assumptions.
7.1 Delegation
The output distortion in our common agency game comes from the fact that each principal
tries to screen the agent’s endogenous information. This indirect communication seems
overly costly. An alternative to the game of voluntary contributions could be for one
principal, say P−i, to provide the public good himself and to have direct communication
between principals.39 Assuming that the agent has no particular advantage in producing
the public good himself, this would amount to consider that the principals’ objective
functions are now respectively:
39Matthews and Postlewaite (1989) analyzed the gains of allowing unmediated communication between
bidders in a double-auction. Contrary to us, they did not give any productive role to one of those bidders.
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Vi(θi, q, t) = θiq − t and V−i(θ−i, q, t) = θ−iq − C(q) + t.
Consider now the case where a mechanism is designed by an uninformed mediator who
gives all bargaining power to principal Pi. It is straightforward to check that the optimal
output obtained this way solves:40,41
θi + θ−i −R(θ−i) = C ′(qi(θi, θ−i)).
The valuation θ−i of the principal with no bargaining power is replaced by the lower
virtual valuation θ−i −R(θ−i).
Furthermore, assuming now that types are uniformly distributed on [θ, θ¯], and that
each principal might have all bargaining power with probability one half, we find:
C ′(q(θ1, θ2)) =
1
2
(C ′(q1(θ1, θ2)) + C ′(q2(θ2, θ1)))
where q(θ1, θ2) is the (unique from Theorem 4) equilibrium output obtained in the common
agency game which is defined by (17). Indeed, under common agency, both principals
have the same bargaining power and their valuations θi are replaced by virtual valuations
θi − 12R(θi) with only a weight one half on the inverse hazard rate distortion term. From
this, we obtain immediately:
Proposition 1 Assume that types are uniformly distributed on [θ, θ¯], then the average
output implemented with asymmetric bargaining situations 1
2
(q1(θ1, θ2) + q2(θ2, θ1)) is
greater (resp. lower, equal) than the equilibrium output under common agency if C ′(·)
is concave (resp. convex, linear).
When C(q) = q
2
2
as in our Running Example, the equilibrium output under common
agency is the exact mean between those implemented by delegating with probability one
half the contracting power to either principal. Because virtual valuations under common
agency only entail half of the inverse hazard rate distortions, common agency reduces
output fluctuations around that mean. Strict concavity of the surplus function implies
that an ex ante efficiency criterion would select common agency rather than an institution
that delegates with probability one half all contracting power to either principal. This
result justifies our focus on a game with voluntary contributions in the first place.
7.2 Pooling and Bunching
Pooling Equilibria. Our focus on separating informative equilibria where principals
reveal their types through their offers made clearer what is the agent’s endogenous infor-
mation vis-a`-vis each of them. This made also the analysis of information aggregation
more relevant by stressing the most favorable case for it.
40Assuming that ∆θ is small enough to get positive output and marginal contributions.
41This result arises also when principal P1 offers himself the mechanism (Mylovanov, 2005).
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In contrast, it is possible to construct uninformative equilibria. In such equilibria, all
types of a given principal pool and offer the same contribution that specifies a payment
for a given output target q∗, the agent learns nothing form observing that contribution,
the other principal has nothing to screen about and is forced to agree on this output
target if any production takes place. Consider thus the forcing contribution:
t∗(q) =
{
C(q∗)
2
> 0 for q = q∗ > 0
0 for q 6= q∗. (29)
When both principals offer this contract, they share equally the cost of producing q∗.
Denote also respectively by Wˆ (θ) = maxq θq − C(q) and qˆ(θ) = argmaxq θq − C(q)
the aggregate payoff of a bilateral coalition between a principal with type θ and the agent
and the corresponding optimal (increasing) output.
Proposition 2 Assume that 2θq∗−C(q∗) ≥ 2Wˆ (θ) and q∗ ≥ qˆ(θ¯).42 There exists a pool-
ing equilibrium in which both principals offer t∗(q) whatever their types. This equilibrium
is sustained with arbitrary out-off equilibrium beliefs.
Running Example (cont.). The forcing contributions above give us an example of a
non-differentiable equilibrium. Assuming that the cost function is quadratic, we imme-
diately observe that the best such symmetric forcing contracts43 implement an output
equal to q∗ = θ + θ¯ giving an ex ante welfare worth W P = 1
2
(θ + θ¯)2. Instead, te-
dious computations show that the linear equilibrium yields a lower ex ante welfare worth
W S = W P − ∆θ2
16
. In other words, principals are somewhat able to weaken competition
with those rather inflexible contracts.
Bunching. The pooling equilibria above are such all types of principals offer the same
contribution and the agent chooses a fixed output. Starting from the separating equilibria
stressed above, one can construct other equilibria which still induce the agent to choose
a fixed output if his type belongs to some interval with a positive measure although
the principals’ types are revealed through contract offers. Coming back to our Running
Example, consider indeed the following schedules:
t(q, θi) =
{
0 if q < q∗(
θi
2
− θ¯
6
)
q + q
2
6
+ t0i (θi), otherwise,
(30)
where q∗ ∈ (3θ − θ¯, 2θ¯) and t0i (θi) = (q
∗)2
12
−
(
θi
2
− θ¯
6
)
q∗. Those schedules are such that
all types (θ1, θ) or (θ, θ2) get zero rent. They are discontinuous at some q
∗ that lies in
the range of equilibrium outputs defined in (6) for the informative equilibrium. It can be
checked that for all pairs (θ1, θ2) such that
3
2
(θ1+ θ2)− θ¯ ≤ q∗, the agent chooses q∗ when
offered those contributions. Bunching arises due to the discontinuity at q∗.44
42It can be easily seen that the set of such q∗ is non-empty when qFB(θ, θ) ≥ qˆ(θ¯), i.e., 2θ ≥ θ¯.
43For this to be an equilibrium, we need to check the condition 2θq∗−C(q∗) ≥ 2Wˆ (θ) from Proposition
2. For our Running Example, this amounts to θ ≥ (√2 − 1)θ, which is slightly stronger than the
assumption 3θ ≥ θ.
44To check that those schedules are best responses to each other, one has only to check that the forcing
contract region (i.e., q < q∗) does not induce deviation for each principal. The condition is similar to that
in Proposition 2, 2θiq∗ − C(q∗) ≥ 2Wˆ (θi) for qˆ(θi) < q∗ which becomes q∗ ∈ ((2
√
2− 1)θ, (2√2 + 1)θ).
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7.3 Communication
Our previous analysis has focused on a particular strategy space for competing princi-
pals: the space of nonlinear contributions. Although it is quite natural, it might restrict
communication since all information revelation takes place through the choice of a partic-
ular schedule and happens thus prior to the agent’s choices on acceptance and production.
One may wonder whether there would be any gain for principals to send messages to their
common agent after the offer stage, or equivalently, to offer a menu of such contributions,
from which they will later pick one after the agent’s acceptance.
Suppose that principal Pi can offer any more general mechanism consisting of a collec-
tion of contribution schedules t˜i(q, ·) = {t˜i(q, θˆi)}θˆi∈Θ. The output q is the agent’s choice
and θˆi a message sent by that principal at a communication stage that takes place follow-
ing the agent’s acceptance. From the Revelation Principle, there is no loss of generality
focusing on such direct communication when computing best-responses in any pure strat-
egy equilibrium. For technical reasons, we assume that t˜i(q, θˆi) is continuous in q and θˆi.
We consider also the following sequence of events where the agent chooses an output after
principals have picked schedules within the menu of contributions they respectively pro-
posed. Finally, communication opens new possibilities for contracting and, in particular,
principals may find it attractive to offer “inscrutable” menus of contribution schedules
that do not reveal their types, letting the agent only break even between accepting or not
such offer in expectations. Accordingly, the strategy space of contributions is enlarged
by allowing also for negative transfers if needed. Payments follow according to the prin-
cipals’ and the agent’s choices. Denote by Γ∗ the game thereby modified by appending
these communication possibilities.
We now show the robustness of any separating equilibrium in Γ as defined through
Theorem 1 to such extension of the strategy space. An equilibrium in Γ yields payoffs to
principals that remain equilibrium payoffs in Γ∗. Given t(q, θ) a separating (equilibrium)
strategy in Γ, we define a degenerate extension of this strategy in Γ∗ as a collection of
contribution schedules t∗(q, ·|θ) such that t∗(q, θˆi|θ) = t(q, θ) for all θˆi ∈ Θ. With such
degenerate extension, principal Pi’s contribution does not depend on his message θˆi.
Proposition 3 Take any symmetric equilibrium in Γ corresponding to the contribution
schedule t(q, θi). There exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of Γ
∗ such that principal Pi
with type θi offers a degenerate menu t
∗(q, θˆi|θi) = t(q, θi) for all (θˆi, θi).45
45The literature on informed principal problems (Myerson, 1983, Maskin and Tirole, 1990, 1992) in
monopolistic environments has stressed the value of pooling offers where different types of principals offer
the same mechanism (a menu of contribution schedules) delaying communication to a later stage. Such
delayed communication is attractive when the agent is risk-averse (because it allows to pool incentive
constraints), or under common values (because it avoids signaling distortions). With private values and
risk-neutrality, no such benefit arises as shown by Mylovanov (2005) in a model as ours with a continuum
of types. Allowing communication does not break equilibrium. Proposition 3 confirms that result. (The
proof in the Appendix constructs the out-of equilibrium beliefs explicitly and uses the compactness of
the menu to prove that each principal finds it optimal to offer the informative mechanism t∗(q, ·|θi) at
a best response.) More precisely, each principal has also in his best-response correspondence in Γ∗ a
degenerate menu of contributions which are all equal to his equilibrium strategy in Γ and all information
revelation takes place at the offer stage. In a related vein, Peters (2003) found conditions under which
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When communication is allowed, we may also ask whether there is the possibility of
sustaining “inscrutable” equilibria in which all principals pool and offer the same menu of
contributions, so that nothing is learned by the agent and his acceptance decision takes
place in expectations. Such ex ante acceptance could relax participation constraints and
reduce screening distortions.
Two remarks are in order. First, Section 7.2 shows that there exist pooling equilibria
with forcing contributions which proves existence of such “inscrutable” equilibria. How-
ever, pooling is by and large induced by the nature of those non-differentiable contribu-
tions that force all types of principals to agree on equal-sharing of the cost of implementing
a given output target. Second, moving back to more flexible differentiable contributions,
next proposition shows an impossibility result.
Proposition 4 There does not exist any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of Γ∗ such that
both principals Pi pool whatever their types θi and offer the same “inscrutable” menu of
differentiable contribution schedules {t(q, θˆi)}θˆi∈Θ.
The intuition behind this proposition can be grasped in two steps. First, observe
that, with an inscrutable offer by principal P2, principal P1 and the agent have sym-
metric but incomplete information on θ2 at the time of contracting. Under such ex
ante contracting, it is well known that the differentiable “sell-out” contribution schedule
tS1 (q, θ1) = θ1q − V S(θ1) (where V S(θ1) is principal P1’s payoff) maximizes the bilateral
payoff of the coalition between that principal and the agent. Provided P2’s offer is itself
differentiable in q, this is the unique way to maximize this bilateral payoff. Offering the
menu {tS(q, θˆ1)}θˆ1∈Θ is thus part of an inscrutable best response for principal P1. By
the same token, principal P2 also offers a menu of sell-out contracts. Given those offers,
the agent chooses an efficient output. But such ex post efficient allocation cannot be
implemented from Theorem 5 which yields a contradiction.
8 Conclusion
Let us summarize the main findings of our analysis.
First, modeling private information on the principals’ preferences in a common agency
game justifies the use of nonlinear contributions for screening purposes, whereas such strat-
egy space is given a priori in previous complete information models. Doing so introduces
incentive compatibility conditions which replace the “truthfulness” requirement used ear-
lier on. Under asymmetric information, principals reveal their types to the common agent
through their mere offer of contributions and try to learn about the types of others which
have been endogenously learned by the common agent from observing these offers.
Second, ex post inefficiency always arises at equilibrium contrary to complete infor-
mation models. The reason is not the standard “free-riding” phenomenon stressed by the
principals do not gain from offering more than a take-it-or-leave-it offer in common agency environments
with complete information on their preferences.
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centralized mechanism design approach but it comes now from the desire of each princi-
pal to screen the agent about the endogenous information he has learned from observing
others’ offers. The common agent at the nexus of all information sets may indeed pretend
that each principal contributes less than what he really does.
Third, the weaker criterion of interim efficiency may be satisfied by some separat-
ing equilibria only when the inverse hazard rate of the types distribution is linear. This
suggests that principals might generally find it worth agreeing on more centralized mech-
anisms to improve on the equilibrium outcome achieved with voluntary contributions.
Fourth, and from a more technical viewpoint, we developed techniques to prove exis-
tence of at least one differentiable equilibrium which solves a complex functional equation
linking the marginal contribution, its type derivative, and its inverse. The difficulty in
solving that equation comes from having boundary conditions at both ends of the types
interval. Existence has to follow from a global approach. The techniques we developed
are likely to be valuable beyond the specific examples analyzed here to tackle existence
in other settings where principals offer contribution schedules in an effort to control a
common agent’s choice. Uniqueness is proved for the uniform distribution.
Finally, although we restricted principals to make single take-it-or-leave-it offers, we
show that the separating equilibria we focus on are robust when principals may entertain
more complex communication with their agent. Other extensions that were investigated
dealt with the existence of pooling and uninformative equilibria and the possibility of
direct communication between principals. The latter provided a justification of the com-
mon agency institution as a means of maximizing ex ante welfare compared with more
random and asymmetric allocations of the bargaining power between principals.
A few other extensions of our framework would be worth to pursue. Indeed, we have
so far focused on the case where principals have no means of communicating one with
the other. The motivation for doing so is twofold. First, and from a practical viewpoint,
this may be viewed as describing equilibrium behavior when principals do not know each
other before contributing or when opening communicating channels between principals is
prohibitively costly or even forbidden. Coming back on our earlier motivating examples,
the first situation may capture what happens when different sovereign countries contribute
for a transnational public good whereas the second case is more likely when different
governmental bodies, separated by “Chineese walls”, contribute to the financing of a
public good. Second, and from a theoretical viewpoint, this focus on non-communication
between principals gives us a reference point to analyze in future research the benefits
of adding either direct or mediated communication. Following Agastya, Menezes and
Sengupta (2006) who studied equilibria in a game of voluntary contributions for a 0-
1 project appended with a cheap-talk stage, we might conjecture that more equilibria
might arise when such communication is possible.
A particular way by which communication takes place is when principals contribute
sequentially.46 Distortions might then depend on whether offers are publicly observable
by subsequent principals or not. In the latter case, we would be back to an analysis of
46See the related work of Marx and Matthews (2000).
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the Stackelberg timing whereas our previous analysis focused on simultaneous offers.47 In
the former case, we would have also to take into account how the first contributors may
manipulate beliefs of subsequent contributors to reduce its own contribution.48
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: The proof is standard (see for instance Laffont and Martimort 2002,
Chapter 3) and is thus omitted.
Proof of Theorem 1: First, we assume that the agent is informed on Pi’s type and we
transform problem Pi(θi) to get P ′i(θi). Then, we compute Pi’s best response {ti(q, θi)}θi∈Θ
to a strategy profile {t−i(q, θ−i)}θ−i∈Θ satisfying IT and SMP. From this, we derive the
optimality conditions (8). To do so, we also assume quasi-concavity of the agent’s problem
and the fact that the participation constraint (5) binds only at θ−i = θ. Second, we show
that these conditions are indeed satisfied.
•Pointwise optimization: Consider Pi’s best response to a strategy profile {t−i(q, θ−i)}θ−i∈Θ
used by P−i and satisfying IT. UD(θ−i|θi) is thus weakly increasing in θ−i and (5) is bind-
ing at θ−i = θ only provided that the marginal contribution pi(q, θi) is positive (we show
this last claim below). Integrating by parts, we then obtain:
Eθ−i
[
UD(θ−i|θi)
]
= Eθ−i
[
R(θ−i)
∂t−i
∂θ
(q(θ−i|θi), θ−i)
]
+ Uˆ−i(θ).
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Inserting this latter expression into Pi’s objective function, and neglecting the second-
order condition (3) (that will be checked below) we obtain the reduced-form problem
P ′i(θi) : max
qD(·|θi)
Eθ−i [Si(q(θ−i|θi), θi, θ−i)] (A1)
where Si(q, θi, θ−i) denotes principal Pi’s virtual surplus defined as
Si(q, θi, θ−i) = θiq + t−i(q, θ−i)− C(q)−R(θ−i)∂t−i
∂θ
(q, θ−i).
Define
ψ−i(q, θ−i) = −p−i(q, θ−i) + C ′(q) +R(θ−i)∂p−i
∂θ
(q, θ−i). (A2)
Si(q, θi, θ−i) is concave (resp. strictly concave) in q when
∂2Si
∂q2
(q, θi, θ−i) =
∂p−i
∂q
(q, θ−i)− C ′′(q)−R(θ−i)∂
2p−i
∂θ∂q
(q, θ−i) ≤ 0 (resp. < 0)
which is true when
∂ψ−i
∂q
(q, θ−i) ≥ 0 (resp. > 0). (A3)
(A3) yields the first condition in (12) for a symmetric equilibrium (where the index −i
has been suppressed). Under strict concavity, optimizing pointwise the virtual surplus
in (A1) gives thus a unique output qD(θ−i|θi) (which is interior since Q¯ is large enough)
implemented at a best response which satisfies
∂Si
∂q
(qD(θ−i|θi), θi, θ−i) = 0⇔ θi = ψ−i(qD(θ−i|θi), θ−i). (A4)
Hence condition (8) holds at a symmetric equilibrium satisfying IT and SMP.
Differentiating (A4) with respect to θi, we obtain:
∂2Si
∂q2
∂qD
∂θi
= −1 (A5)
which yields the monotonicity property, under strict concavity
∂qD
∂θi
> 0.
Therefore, principal Pi offers different output schedules as his type changes so that the
family ti(q, θi) is separating in θi.
Differentiating (A4) with respect to θ−i, we obtain:
∂2Si
∂q2
∂qD
∂θ−i
= R(θ−i)
∂2p−i
∂θ2
−
(
1− R˙(θ−i)
) ∂p−i
∂θ
. (A6)
Differentiating (A2) with respect to θ−i allows us to simplify (A6) to get
∂2Si
∂q2
∂qD
∂θ−i
=
∂ψ−i
∂θ
. (A7)
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Hence, the other monotonicity property
∂qD
∂θ−i
(θ−i|θi) ≥ 0 (resp. > 0)
and SMP ensures that the second-order condition for the agent’s problem (3) holds when
∂ψ−i
∂θ
(q, θ−i) ≤ 0 (resp. < 0). (A8)
Again (A8) yields the second condition in (12) at a symmetric equilibrium with an output
schedule increasing in both arguments.
• Implementation of the best response through a nonlinear contribution ti(q, θi):
At a best response to P−i’s offer t−i(q, θ−i) (with margin p−i(q, θ−i)), Pi cannot do bet-
ter than offering himself a direct revelation mechanism which implements the increasing
output qD(·|θi) satisfying
θi+p−i(qD(θ−i|θi), θ−i)−C ′(qD(θ−i|θi)) = θi−pi(qD(θ−i|θi), θi) = R(θ−i)∂pi
∂θ
(qD(θ−i|θi), θ−i)
(A9)
(which gives (8) at a symmetric equilibrium).
Denote the inverse function for qD(θ−i|θi) by θD−i(·|θi). We can reconstruct the non-
linear schedule ti(q, θi) that Pi could as well offer as ti(q, θi) = t
D
i (θ
D
−i(q|θi)|θi) for q in
the range of qD(·|θi). For q ≥ qD(θ¯|θi), we extend that schedule in a smooth-pasting
way with a constant slope pi(q, θi) = θi, i.e., ti(q, θi) = ti(q
D(θ¯|θi), θi) + θi(q − qD(θ¯|θi))
where ti(q
D(θ¯|θi), θi) = ti(qD(θ|θi), θi) +
∫ qD(θ¯|θi)
qD(θ|θi) pi(q, θi)dq and ti(q
D(θ|θi), θi) is deter-
mined through the binding participation constraint UD(θ|θi) = Uˆ−i(θ). Note that this
upward extension satisfies IT and SMP. For q ≤ qD(θ|θi), ti(q, θi) is also extended in a
smooth-pasting way below qD(θ|θi) as a non-negative schedule by the formula ti(q, θi) =
max
{
0, ti(q
D(θ|θi), θi) +
∫ q
qD(θ|θi) p(x, θi)dx
}
where we take the following extension p(x, θi) =∫ θi
θ
∂p
∂θi
(qD(θ|y), y)dy for all x ≤ qD(θ|θi). This downward extension satisfies IT and SMP
by construction.
When written in terms of contribution schedules, the first- and second-order conditions
for the agent’s problem can be expressed as:
pi(q
D(θ−i|θi), θi) + p−i(qD(θ−i|θi), θ−i) = C ′(qD(θ−i|θi)), (A10)
and
∂pi
∂q
(qD(θ−i|θi), θi) + ∂p−i
∂q
(qD(θ−i|θi), θ−i)− C ′′(qD(θ−i|θi)) ≤ 0
which give (9) and (10) at a symmetric equilibrium.
• The agent’s participation constraint (5) binds at θ: We proceed with several
lemmata. Define first the output level qˆ−i(θ−i) when the agent does not take Pi’s contri-
bution as an arbitrary selection in the correspondence argmax
q∈Q
t−i(q, θ−i) − C(q) with
qˆ−i(θ−i) = 0 (resp. > 0) if max
q∈Q
t−i(q, θ−i)−C(q) = 0 (resp. max
q∈Q
t−i(q, θ−i)−C(q) > 0).
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Lemma 4 Assume that pi(q, θi) ≥ 0 for all (q, θi) and that ti(q, θi) satisfies SMP. Then,
for any (θi, θ−i), we have:
qD(θ−i|θi) ≥ qD(θ−i|θ) ≥ qˆ−i(θ−i). (A11)
Proof : By the definitions of qˆ(θ−i) and qD(θ−i|θ) respectively, we have:
t−i(qˆ(θ−i), θ−i)− C(qˆ(θ−i)) ≥ t−i(qD(θ−i|θ), θ−i)− C(qD(θ−i|θ)),
ti(q
D(θ−i|θ), θ)+t−i(qD(θ−i|θ), θ−i)−C(qD(θ−i|θ)) ≥ ti(qˆ(θ−i), θ)+t−i(qˆ(θ−i), θ−i)−C(qˆ(θ−i)).
Adding up these inequalities, we get
ti(q
D(θ−i|θ), θ)− ti(qˆ(θ−i), θ) =
∫ qD(θ−i|θ)
qˆ(θ−i)
pi(x, θ)dx ≥ 0.
Since marginal transfers are positive, the last inequality is true only if qD(θ−i|θ) ≥ qˆ(θ−i).
Moreover, if pi(q, θi) satisfies SMP, pi(q
D(θ−i|θi), θi) ≥ pi(qD(θ−i|θi), θ) and, from
(A10), we obtain:
pi(q
D(θ−i|θi), θ) + p−i(qD(θ−i|θi), θ−i)− C ′(qD(θ−i|θi)) ≤ 0.
Quasi-concavity of the agent’s problem at (θ, θ−i) yields finally qD(θ−i|θi) ≥ qD(θ−i|θ).
Thus, we necessarily have qˆ−i(θ−i) ≤ qD(θi|θ−i) = qD(θ−i|θi) for all θi.
Lemma 5 Assume that pi(q, θi) ≥ 0 for all (q, θi). Then, UD(θ−i|θi) ≥ Uˆ−i(θ−i) for any
(θi, θ−i) if UD(θ|θi) ≥ Uˆ−i(θ) holds.
Proof : Using the Envelope Theorem, we get ∂U
D
∂θ−i
(θ−i|θi) = ∂t−i∂θ (qD(θ−i|θi), θ−i) and
∂Uˆ−i
∂θ−i
(θ−i) =
∂t−i
∂θ
(qˆ−i(θ−i), θ−i). Hence, we always get:
∂Uˆ−i
∂θ−i
(θ−i) =
∂t−i
∂θ
(qˆ−i(θ−i), θ−i) ≤ ∂t−i
∂θ
(qD(θ−i|θi), θ−i) = ∂U
D
∂θ−i
(θ−i|θi)
where the last inequality follows from (A11) and the fact that t−i(q, θ−i) satisfies SMP.
Therefore, UD(θ−i|θi) ≥ Uˆ−i(θ−i) for any (θi, θ−i) if UD(θ|θi) ≥ Uˆ−i(θ) holds.
Lemma 5 shows that the agent’s participation constraint (5) binds necessarily at θ,
UD(θ|θi) = Uˆ−i(θ) at any Pi’s best response to a strategy profile {t−i(q, θ−i)}θ−i∈Θ sat-
isfying IT and SMP used by P−i when this best response also satisfies SMP and has a
positive marginal contribution.
• Non-negative transfers: Observe also that UD(θ|θi) = Uˆ−i(θ) implies
ti(q
D(θ|θi)) = ti(qˆ(θ))− C(qˆ(θ))−
(
ti(q
D(θ|θi))− C(qD(θ|θi))
) ≥ 0
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where the last inequality follows from the definition of qˆ(θ). This gives, for any θ−i,
ti(q
D(θ−i|θi))− ti(qD(θ|θi)) =
∫ qD(θ|θi)
qD(θ−i|θi)
p(x|θi)dx ≥ 0
when marginal contributions are positive. This in turn implies that ti(q
D(θ−i|θi)) ≥ 0 for
any equilibrium output. Finally, the extension defined above respects non-negativity.
• Out-of equilibrium beliefs and best responses in Γ: The analysis above has as-
sumed that the agent was informed on Pi’s type when the latter computes his best response
to the strategy profile {t−i(q, θ−i)}θ−i∈Θ satisfying IT and SMP used by P−i. We show
first that the strategy profile {ti(q, θi)}θi∈Θ is also a best response to {t−i(q, θ−i)}θ−i∈Θ in
the game Γ where the agent is a priori uninformed on Pi’s type. Second, we show that
any off-equilibrium beliefs sustain the strategy profile {ti(q, θi)}θi∈Θ as a best response in
the game Γ where principals are privately informed.
Consider the collection of strategies {ti(q, θˆi)}θˆi∈Θ. These strategies are all distinct so
that, if played in a separating equilibrium, Pi reveals his type θi to the agent when he
chooses ti(q, θi). We want to prove that this menu of contributions is incentive compatible
for Pi. Denote by V˜i(θi, θˆi) principal Pi’s payoff when his type is θi and he picks the strategy
ti(q, θˆi) for some θˆi ∈ Θ. Denote also Vi(θi) = V˜i(θi, θi) the equilibrium payoff.
Facing the contributions ti(q, θˆi) and t−i(q, θ−i), the agent chooses the quantity qD(θ−i|θˆi).
V˜i(θi, θˆi) can be written as:
V˜i(θi, θˆi) = Eθ−i
[
θiq
D(θ−i|θˆi)− ti(qD(θ−i|θˆi), θˆi)
]
= Eθ−i
[
Si(q
D(θ−i|θˆi), θˆi, θ−i) + (θi − θˆi)qD(θ−i|θˆi)
]
− Uˆ−i(θ).
We can now compute:
∂V˜i
∂θˆi
(θi, θˆi) = Eθ−i
[
∂Si
∂q
(qD(θ−i|θˆi), θi, θ−i)∂q
D
∂θˆi
(θ−i|θˆi)
]
.
Since Si(·, θi, θ−i) is a strictly concave function with critical point at q = qD(θ−i|θi) and
∂qD
∂θˆi
(θ−i|θˆi) ≥ 0, we have:
∂V˜i
∂θˆi
(θi, θˆi) ≥ 0 (resp. =) if and only if θi ≥ θˆi. (resp. =). (A12)
Condition (A12) shows then that the collection of strategies {ti(q, θˆi)}θˆi∈Θ is incentive
compatible from principal Pi’s viewpoint.
Consider now a deviation by principal Pi with type θi to a contribution schedule
zi(q) such that zi(q) /∈ {ti(q, θˆi)}θˆi∈Θ. Facing the contributions zi(q) and t−i(q, θ−i), the
agent chooses a quantity q˜(θ−i|θi) in the correspondence argmaxq zi(q)+ t−i(q, θ−i)−C(q)
whatever his beliefs on Pi’s type. Now observe that an upper bound on the payoff for
such deviation is obtained when we replace the agent’s participation constraint (5) by the
weaker requirement
UD(θ−i|θi) ≥ 0.
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In this relaxed problem, the agent’s participation constraint binds necessarily at θ only.
The payoff in any such deviation is thus no greater than
Eθ−i [Si(q˜(θ−i|θi), θi, θ−i)]− Uˆ−i(θ) ≤ Vi(θi) = Eθ−i
[
Si(q
D(θ−i|θi), θi, θ−i)
]− Uˆ−i(θ),
where the right-hand side is principal Pi’s payoff when he offers ti(q, θi). This proves that
ti(q, θi) is a best response in Γ when principal Pi’s type is θi.
Proof of Theorem 2:
• First-best at the top: Using (8) for θ1 = θ2 = θ¯ and (9) yields the result.
•Downward distortions: Observe that SMP and (8) altogether imply θi ≥ p(q(θ1, θ2), θi).
Summing over i and taking into account (9) yield θ1+θ2 = C
′(qFB(θ1, θ2)) ≥ C ′(q(θ1, θ2))
with equality only when θ1 = θ2 = θ¯.
• Non-negative rent for the agent and equilibrium contributions: From Lemma
5, we know that in any symmetric equilibrium
U(θi, θ) = t(q(θi, θ), θ) + t(q(θi, θ), θi)− C(q(θi, θ)) = Uˆ−i(θ) for all θi
where, using above notations, Uˆ−i(θ) = t(qˆ(θ), θ)− C(qˆ(θ)) ≥ 0. For θi = θ, we get:
U(θ, θ) = 2t(q(θ, θ), θ)− C(q(θ, θ)) = t(qˆ(θ), θ)− C(qˆ(θ)).
Suppose Uˆ−i(θ) > 0, then observe that t(qˆ(θ), θ) > C(qˆ(θ)) > 0 and thus U(θ, θ) <
2t(qˆ(θ), θ)−C(qˆ(θ)), a contradiction with the definition of q(θ, θ). Hence, we have neces-
sarily U(θ, θ) = 0 which means t(q(θ, θ), θ) = C(q(θ,θ))
2
> 0. Therefore, we get
U(θi, θ) = Uˆ−i(θ) = 0 for all θi. (A13)
For θi ≥ θ, observe that
t(q(θi, θ), θ) = t(q(θ, θ), θ) +
∫ q(θi,θ)
q(θ,θ)
p(x, θ)dx
so that (A13) yields
t(q(θi, θ), θi) = C(q(θi, θ))− C(q(θ, θ))
2
−
∫ q(θi,θ)
q(θ,θ)
p(x, θ)dx. (A14)
Differentiating with respect to θi yields:
∂t
∂θi
(q(θi, θ), θi) + (p(q(θi, θ), θi) + p(q(θi, θ), θ)− C ′(q(θi, θ)) ∂q
∂θi
(θi, θ) = 0.
Taking thus into account the agent’s first-order condition (9), we obtain ∂t
∂θi
(q(θi, θ), θi) = 0
and finally (13).
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Moreover, we have:
t(q(θi, θj), θi)− t(q(θi, θ), θi) =
∫ q(θi,θj)
q(θi,θ)
p(x, θi)dx > 0
which, taken in tandem with (A14), defines the transfer t(q(θi, θj), θi) on the range of
equilibrium outputs q(θi, θj).
Note also that
∂t
∂θi
(q(θi, θj), θi) =
∂t
∂θi
(q(θi, θ), θi) +
∫ q(θi,θj)
q(θi,θ)
∂p
∂θ
(x, θi)dx =
∫ q(θi,θj)
q(θi,θ)
∂p
∂θ
(x, θi)dx ≥ 0
and thus
∂t
∂θi
(q(θi, θj), θi) ≥ 0 for θj ≥ θ
when SMP holds. Using (2), we deduce from that the agent’s rent is everywhere non-
negative and zero only when θi = θ for at least one i.
Boundaries conditions for the system (20):
Lemma 6 The following properties hold:
• For q such that 2θ¯ ≥ C ′(q) ≥ θ¯+θ− 1
2f(θ)
, the highest type on the q-isoquant is θ¯ whereas
the lowest type θ(q) ≥ θ is increasing in q and defined by the condition:
C ′(q) = θ¯ + θ(q)− 1
2
R(θ(q)); (A15)
Marginal contributions at these boundaries satisfy:
p(q, θ(q)) = θ(q),
∂p
∂θ
(q, θ(q)) =
1
2
; (A16)
p(q, θ¯) = C ′(q)− θ(q) < θ¯, ∂p
∂θ
(q, θ¯) > 0; (A17)
• For q such that C ′(q) ≤ θ¯ + θ − 1
2f(θ)
, the lowest type on the q−isoquant is θ and the
highest one is θ¯(q) with:
p(q, θ¯(q)) = θ¯(q)−R(θ)∂p
∂θ
(q, θ),
∂p
∂θ
(q, θ¯(q)) =
θ − p(q, θ)
R(θ¯(q))
> 0; (A18)
p(q, θ) < θ,
∂p
∂θ
(q, θ) > 0. (A19)
Proof: First consider a q-isoquant which crosses the vertical axis at θ¯. Define θ(q) such
that θ(q) = ψ(q, θ¯) (and thus θ¯ = ψ(q, θ(q))). From the equilibrium conditions (20) taken
respectively at θ(q) and θ¯, we get:
p(q, θ(q)) = θ(q) and θ¯ + p(q, θ(q))− C ′(q) = R(θ(q))∂p
∂θ
(q, θ(q)), (A20)
37
which is the first part of (A16).
From SMP and θ(q) < θ¯, we get θ¯ > p(q, θ¯), which gives the first part of (A17).
Using (20), we get:
∂ψ
∂θ
(q, θ) = −
∂p
∂θ
(q, θ)
∂p
∂θ
(q, ψ(q, θ))
= −R(ψ(q, θ))(ψ(q, θ) + p(q, θ)− C
′(q))
R(θ)(θ − p(q, θ)) . (A21)
Using (A21) to evaluate ∂ψ
∂θ
(q, θ) at θ(q) and using Lhospital’s rule yield
∂ψ
∂θ
(q, θ(q)) = −∂ψ
∂θ
(q, θ(q))
R˙(θ¯)(θ¯ + p(q, θ(q))− C ′(q))
R(θ(q))
(
1− ∂p
∂θ
(q, θ(q))
) = ∂ψ
∂θ
(q, θ(q))
∂p
∂θ
(q, θ(q))
1− ∂p
∂θ
(q, θ(q))
where we have used R˙(θ¯) = −1 and (A20) to get the last equality. The only possibility for
having ∂ψ
∂θ
(q, θ(q)) < 0 is ∂p
∂θ
(q, θ(q)) = 1
2
which is the second part of (A16) and gives also
(A15). This and (A21) yields the second part of (A17). Therefore, θ(q) is defined by (A15)
and, given that R(·) is decreasing, this can only be possible when C ′(q) ≥ θ¯ + θ − 1
2f(θ)
.
For C ′(q) < θ¯+θ− 1
2f(θ)
, the conditions coming from the equilibrium behavior of types
θ and θ¯(q) are given by (A18) and (A19).
Proof of Theorem 3: Fix q such that 2θ ≥ C ′(q) ≥ θ¯ + θ − 1
2f(θ)
. The boundary
condition (A16) can be used to integrate (23) and get G(·, q) as a solution to:
1−G(p, q) = (1− F (θ(q)))exp
(
−
∫ p
θ(q)
dx
F−1(G(C ′(q)− x, q))− C ′(q) + x
)
. (A22)
Consider now the mapping Φ(·) such that:
1− Φ(G)(p) = (1− F (θ(q))) exp
(
−
∫ p
θ(q)
dx
F−1(G(C ′(q)− x))− C ′(q) + x
)
. (A23)
An equilibrium distributionG(·, q) (defined on [θ(q), C ′(q)−θ(q)] and extended on [θ, C ′(q)−
θ(q)] as explained in the text) is thus a fixed-point of the mapping Φ(·).
Several facts immediately follow from the definition (A23).
• Boundary conditions: Φ(G)(θ(q)) = F (θ(q)), and Φ(G)(C ′(q) − θ(q)) = 149 when
G(θ(q), q) = F (θ(q));
• Φ(·) is monotonically decreasing and thus Φ2(·) is monotonically increasing: G1 ≤
G2 implies Φ(G1) ≥ Φ(G2).
49Notice that from (A23), lim
p→C′(q)−θ(q)
Φ(G)(p) ≤ 1. Hence, Φ(G) is then a distribution function well
defined at C ′(q)− θ(q) as 1.
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Consider the function
I(p) =
{
1 if p ∈ (θ(q), C ′(q)− θ(q)],
F (p) if p ∈ [θ, θ(q)].
This is not a distribution admitting a density function as required by our formalism. How-
ever, we may still apply twice the mapping Φ(·) above to it to generate such distribution.
For p ∈ [θ(q), C ′(q)− θ(q)), we have:
1−Φ(I)(p) = (1−F (θ(q))) exp
(
−
∫ p
θ(q)
dx
θ¯ − C ′(q) + x
)
= (1−F (θ(q)))
(
θ¯ + θ(q)− C ′(q)
θ¯ − C ′(q) + p
)
with
Φ(I)(C ′(q)− θ(q)) = 1 and lim
p→C′(q)−θ(q)
Φ(I)(p) < 1.
One can check that
Φ(F )(p) =
{
1 if p > θ(q)
θ(q) if p = θ(q)
and Φ2(F ) = Φ(I) (A24)
Moreover, we want to find a condition ensuring that the mapping Φ(·) will be onto and
that the distribution of price at any iteration starting from Φ(I)(·) never crosses F (·)
to avoid infinite terms in the denominator on the right-hand side of (A23). A sufficient
condition is that Φ(I)(p) ≥ F (p) for all p ∈ [θ(q), C ′(q)− θ(q)]. This amounts to:
χ(p) = (1− F (p))(θ¯ + p− C ′(q))− (1− F (θ(q)))(θ¯ + θ(q)− C ′(q)) ≥ 0. (A25)
Note that χ(θ(q)) = 0 and that χ(·), which is quasi-concave under the assumption R˙(p) ≤
0, achieves its maximum at p∗ < C ′(q)− θ(q) such that θ¯ + p∗ − C ′(q) = 1−F (p∗)
f(p∗) . Hence,
(A25) holds when χ(C ′(q) − θ(q)) > 0. This last condition holds when 1−F (x)
θ¯−x increases
with x, a sufficient condition is min
θ∈Θ
θ +R(θ) = θ¯.
Consider now the following sequence φn = Φ
n(φ0) with φ0 = F. One can easily show
that φ2k is increasing whereas φ2k+1 is decreasing in k. Moreover, φ2 < 1 = φ1 and thus,
by iterating, we get φ2k ≤ φ2k+1. Moreover, as soon as n ≥ 2, φn(θ(q)) = F (θ(q)) and
φn(C
′(q) − θ(q)) = 1. Now, denote by φ and φ¯ the respective limits of φ2k and φ2k+1.
We have: φ ≤ φ¯, φ = Φ(φ¯) and φ¯ = Φ(φ). Note that φ(θ(q)) = φ¯(θ(q)) = F (θ(q)) and
φ(C ′(q)− θ(q)) = φ¯(C ′(q)− θ(q)) = 1. φ(·) and φ¯(·) are by definition both differentiable
at C ′(q) − θ(q). Moreover, φ˙2k(C ′(q) − θ(q)) is decreasing in k and φ˙2k+1(C ′(q) − θ(q))
increasing in k so that, in the limit, +∞ > φ˙(C ′(q) − θ(q)) ≥ ˙¯φ(C ′(q) − θ(q)) > 0 =
φ˙1(C
′(q)− θ(q)).
Define firstN = {G(·)| G(·) is increasing and φ(p) ≤ G(p) ≤ φ¯(p) for all p ∈ [θ(q), C ′(q)−
θ(q)]}. Clearly, N is convex and non-empty. Let us also define:
N∗ = {G(·)| G(·) is increasing and φ(p) ≤ G(p) ≤ φ¯(p) for all p ∈ [θ(q), C ′(q)− θ(q)]
and |G(p)−G(p′)| ≤ K|p− p′|}
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where K < +∞ is chosen below. Φ(·) maps N into N∗. Indeed, from the Theorem of
Intermediate Values, we have:
|Φ(G)(p)− Φ(G)(p′)| = |Φ˙(G)(ζ)||p− p′|
for some ζ ∈ [p, p′] where
|Φ˙(G)(ζ)| = 1− F (θ(q))
F−1(G(C ′(q)− ζ))− C ′(q) + ζ exp
(
−
∫ ζ
θ(q)
dx
F−1(G(C ′(q)− x))− C ′(q) + x
)
.
Using that φ ≤ G ≤ φ¯, we get
| ˙Φ(G)(ζ)| ≤ 1− F (θ(q))
F−1(φ(C ′(q)− ζ))− C ′(q) + ζ exp
(
−
∫ ζ
θ(q)
dx
F−1(φ¯(C ′(q)− x))− C ′(q) + x
)
=
1− φ(ζ)
F−1(φ(C ′(q)− ζ))− C ′(q) + ζ .
The right-hand side above is in fact a bounded function of ζ over [θ(q), C ′(q) − θ(q)].
Indeed, using Lhospital rule, we have:
lim
ζ→C′(q)−θ(q)
1− φ(ζ)
F−1(φ(C ′(q)− ζ))− C ′(q) + ζ = −
φ˙(C ′(q)− θ(q))
1− φ˙(θ(q))
f(θ(q))
.
Using φ = Φ(φ¯) and thus
φ˙(p)
1− φ(p) =
1
F−1(φ¯(C ′(q)− p))− C ′(q) + p
taken at p = θ(q) yields
φ˙(θ(q)) =
1− F (θ(q))
θ¯ + θ(q)− C ′(q) = 2f(θ(q)).
Hence, we get
lim
ζ→C′(q)−θ(q)
1− φ(ζ)
F−1(φ(C ′(q)− ζ))− C ′(q) + ζ = φ˙(C
′(q)− θ(q)).
Finally, denote K ′ = supζ∈[θ(q),C′(q)−θ(q)]
1−φ(ζ)
F−1(φ(C′(q)−ζ))−C′(q)+ζ < +∞. Take now K =
sup{K ′, supζ φ˙(ζ), supζ ˙¯φ(ζ)}. Such value of K ensures that N∗ is non-empty because at
least φ and φ¯ are in it. Moreover, by Ascoli Theorem, N∗ is compact.
Finally, Φ(·) is continuous on N . To show that consider two distributions G and H in
N . We have:
Φ(G)(p)− Φ(H)(p) = (1− F (θ(q))
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×
(
exp
(
−
∫ p
θ(q)
dx
F−1(H(C ′(q)− x))− C ′(q) + x
)
− exp
(
−
∫ p
θ(q)
dx
F−1(G(C ′(q)− x))− C ′(q) + x
))
.
(A26)
First, note that H ≤ φ¯ implies
exp
(
−
∫ p
θ(q)
dx
F−1(H(C ′(q)− x))− C ′(q) + x
)
≤ exp
(
−
∫ p
θ(q)
dx
F−1(φ¯(C ′(q)− x))− C ′(q) + x
)
and similarly, G ≤ φ¯ implies
exp
(
−
∫ p
θ(q)
dx
F−1(G(C ′(q)− x))− C ′(q) + x
)
≤ exp
(
−
∫ p
θ(q)
dx
F−1(φ¯(C ′(q)− x))− C ′(q) + x
)
.
Now fix ² arbitrarily small. There exists η such that for p ≥ C ′(q) − θ(q) − η, both
right-hand sides above are less than ² and thus |Φ(G)(p) − Φ(H)(p)| ≤ 2². For p ∈
[θ(q), C ′(q) − θ(q) − η], the right-hand side of (A26) can be made arbitrarily small, say
less than 2², by taking H close enough to G with respect to || · ||∞. Gathering everything
||Φ(G)− Φ(H)||∞ = sup
p
|Φ(G)(p)− Φ(H)(p)| ≤ 2² which ensures continuity.
Therefore Φ(·) is a compact mapping from N onto N∗ ⊆ N . Existence of G(·, q)
follows then Schauder’s Second Theorem (Burton 2005, p.184) which states that a compact
mapping on a convex non-empty subset of a Banach space N has a fixed point.
Proof of Theorem 4: If G(·) (we omit the dependence on q for simplicity) corresponds
to the marginal price distribution in a symmetric equilibrium, then it must be a solution
of the following system of ordinary differential equations (where H(p) = G(C ′(q)− p)):
·
G(p)
1−G(p) =
1
F−1(H(p))− C ′(q) + p, (A27)
·
H(p)
1−H(p) = −
1
F−1(G(p))− p, (A28)
for all p ∈ [θ(q), C ′(q)− θ(q)] with the boundary conditions
G(θ(q)) = H(C ′(q)− θ(q)) = F (θ(q)), G(C ′(q)− θ(q)) = H(θ(q)) = 1. (A29)
Let F (θ) = θ−θ
∆θ
be the uniform cumulative distribution on the interval [θ, θ] (where
∆θ = θ¯ − θ). Then, F−1(x) = ∆θx + θ and θ(q) = 2
3
(C ′(q) − θ¯) (θ(q) ≥ θ requires thus
3θ + θ¯ ≥ C ′(q)). The system becomes
·
G(p)(∆θH(p) + θ − C ′(q) + p) = 1−G(p),
·
H(p)(∆θG(p) + θ − t) = −1 +H(p).
Adding up these equations we get
∆θ[
·
G(p)H(p) +G(p)
·
H(p)] + (θ − C ′(q))
·
G(p) + θ
·
H(p) + p[
·
G(p)−
·
H(p)] = G(p)−H(p).
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Integrating, there exists a constant of integration K such that:
∆θG(p)H(p) + p(G(p)−H(p)) + (θ − C ′(q))G(p) + θH(p) = K.
At any equilibrium, this constant is uniquely determined. Indeed, at t = θ(q) we have
that G(p) = F (θ(q)) and H(θ(q)) = 1 and therefore K = (θ(q) + θ − C ′(q)) (θ(q)−θ)
∆θ
> 0.
Inserting into (A28) yields:
H(p) =
K + (C ′(q)− β − p)G(p)
∆θG(p) + θ − p .
Substituting into (A27), we get
·
G(p)
1−G(p) =
∆θG(p) + θ − p
∆θK + (C ′(q)− θ − p)(p− θ) . (A30)
Notice that, given that G(p) is an equilibrium, ∆θK + (C ′(q)− θ − p)(p− θ) > 0 for all
p ∈ (θ(q), C ′(q)−θ(q)). This implies that (A30) is an ordinary differential equation which
is regular on ∆θK + (C ′(q) − θ − p)(p − θ) > 0 and the local uniqueness of a solution
holds at any such p.
Suppose then that there are two symmetric equilibria distributions in two putative
distinct equilibria with the same boundary conditions, i.e., two fixed-points G1 and G2 for
Φ(·) such that G1(θ(q)) = G2(θ(q)) = F (θ(q)), G1(C ′(q)− θ(q)) = G2(C ′(q)− θ(q)) = 1.
Then, one of these distributions cannot dominate the other in the sense of first-order
stochastic dominance; they necessarily cross each other at least once on (θ(q), C ′(q)−θ(q)).
Suppose otherwise, i.e., G1(p) ≤ G2(p) for p ∈ (θ(q), C ′(q) − θ(q)). Using that Φ(·) is
monotonic, we get G1 = Φ(G1) ≥ G2 = Φ(G2) and, finally, G1 = G2. But then, G1 and
G2 must cross at some p0 ∈ (θ(q), C ′(q) − θ(q)) and both satisfy (A30) for the same K.
However, this is a contradiction with the local uniqueness for a solution to (A30). Hence,
global uniqueness of a solution follows.
Proof of Example 2 (cont.): Equations (19) and (20) can be first transformed into
a system of first-order differential equations to get both the marginal contribution of a
given type and the identity of his conjugate. Using (19), we get:
∂p
∂θ
(q, θ) = r(ψ(q, θ) + p(q, θ)− C ′(q)). (A31)
From equation (A21), we obtain:
∂p
∂θ
(q, θ) = −∂p
∂θ
(q, ψ(q, θ))
∂ψ
∂θ
(q, θ).
Differentiating (A31) with respect to θ, using the last expression, replacing θ by ψ(q, θ)
in (A31) and (19) yield:
∂p
∂θ
(q, θ) (1− r(θ − p(q, θ))) + (θ − p(q, θ))∂
2p
∂θ2
(q, θ) = 0. (A32)
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The solutions to this differential equation do not depend on q and we denote u(θ) =
θ− 1
r
− p(q, θ). We look for such non-negative solutions u(·) with 0 < u˙(θ) ≤ 1 where the
last inequality is needed to satisfy SMP. (A32) can also be written as
u¨(θ)(ru(θ) + 1) + ru(θ)(1− u˙(θ)) = 0.
Defining φ(·) as u˙(θ) = φ(u(θ)), we get:
φ′(u)
φ(u)
1− φ(u) = −
ru
1 + ru
.
A first quadrature yields:
φ(u) + ln(1− φ(u)) = −λ+ u− 1
r
ln(1 + ru)
where λ is some constant. Since the function φ + ln(1 − φ) is monotonically decreasing
on [0, 1), it is invertible. Denote G(·) its inverse defined over R−. We obtain:
u˙(θ) = G
(
−λ+ u(θ)− 1
r
ln(1 + ru(θ))
)
. (A33)
Take now any initial value u(θ) ∈ (0, θ − 1
r
) and consider the solution u(·) to (A33) with
this initial condition when λ > u(θ) − 1
r
ln(1 + ru(θ)). u(·) is, non-negative, strictly
increasing and has a slope less than 1, so that it never reaches the boundary v(θ) = θ− 1
r
.
Using the Theorem of Uniqueness for the solution to such differential equation (Hirsh and
Smale 1974, p.164), it can also be shown that such solution converges without reaching it
towards a limit u∞ defined as λ = u∞ − 1r ln(1 + ru∞).
Proof of Lemma 2: Denote Pi’s ex post payoff for a given pair (θi, θ−i) as:
Vi(θi, θ−i) = θiq(θi, θ−i)− t(q(θi, θ−i), θi).
Simple algebra gives:
U(θ1, θ2) +
2∑
i=1
Vi(θi, θ−i) =
(
2∑
i=1
θi
)
q(θ1, θ2)− C(q(θ1, θ2)). (A34)
From the fact that U(θ, θ) = 0 in any symmetric equilibrium, we must have:
2V (θ, θ) = 2θq(θ, θ)− C(q(θ, θ)) > 0. (A35)
Indeed, we have θ − p(q(θ, θ), θ) > 0 from SMP and (8). Using (9), we get:
2θ > C ′(q(θ, θ)) >
C(q(θ, θ))
q(θ, θ)
where the last inequality follows from the strict convexity of C(·), C(0) = 0 and the fact
that q(θ, θ) > 0 when p(q, θ) > 0 and C ′(0) = 0.
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We also obtain the following expressions of the partial derivatives of V (·):
∂Vi
∂θ−i
(θi, θ−i) = (θi − p(q(θi, θ−i), θi)) ∂q
∂θ−i
(θi, θ−i) = R(θ−i)
∂p
∂θ
(q(θi, θ−i), θ−i)
∂q
∂θ−i
(θi, θ−i).
(A36)
and
∂Vi
∂θi
(θi, θ−i) = q(θi, θ−i) + (θi − p(q(θi, θ−i), θi)) ∂q
∂θi
(θi, θ−i)− ∂t
∂θ
(q(θi, θ−i), θi)
= q(θi, θ−i) +R(θ−i)
∂2U
∂θ1∂θ2
(θ1, θ2)− ∂U
∂θi
(θ1, θ2). (A37)
Integrating (A37) yields
Vi(θi, θ−i) = φ(θ−i) +
∫ θi
θ
q(x, θ−i)dx+R(θ−i)
∂U
∂θ−i
(θi, θ−i)− U(θi, θ−i) (A38)
for some function φ(·). Because U(θ, θ−i) = 0 for all θ−i, one gets
Vi(θ, θ−i) = φ(θ−i). (A39)
Inserting the expressions obtained from (A38) and (A39) into (A34) yields:
−U(θi, θ−i) +
2∑
i=1
R(θi)
∂U
∂θi
(θi, θ−i)
=
(
2∑
i=1
θi
)
q(θ1, θ2)− C(q(θ1, θ2))−
2∑
i=1
(
φ(θi) +
∫ θi
θ
q(x, θ−i)dx
)
. (A40)
Simple integrations by parts show that:
E(θ1,θ2)
[
−U(θ1, θ2) +
2∑
i=1
R(θi)
∂U
∂θi
(θ1, θ2)
]
= E(θ1,θ2) [U(θ1, θ2)] .
Because in any equilibrium U(θ1, θ2) ≥ 0, we must have from (A40):
E(θ1,θ2)
[(
2∑
i=1
θi
)
q(θ1, θ2)− C(q(θ1, θ2))−
2∑
i=1
∫ θi
θ
q(x, θ−i)dx
]
≥
2∑
i=1
Eθi [φ(θi)] .
Integrating by parts the left-hand side above yields the following inequality:
E(θ1,θ2)
[(
2∑
i=1
θi −R(θi)
)
q(θ1, θ2)− C(q(θ1, θ2))
]
≥
2∑
i=1
Eθi [φ(θi)] .
To get (26), note that φ′(θ−i) ≥ 0 from (A39) and that φ(θ) > 0 is given by (A35).
In passing, using (A38), integrating by parts and taking into account that U(θi, θ) = 0
show also that
Eθ−i [V (θi, θ−i)] = Eθ−i [φ(θ−i)] +
∫ θi
θ
Eθ−i [q(x, θ−i)] dx ≥ φ(θ) > 0.
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Hence, the principals’ interim participation constraints are satisfied.
Proof of Theorem 5: Define first
J(θ2) = Eθ1
[(
2∑
i=1
θi −R(θi)
)
qFB(θ1, θ2)− C(qFB(θ1, θ2))
]
and I = Eθ2 [J(θ2)] .
Integrating by parts and using d
dx
(x(F (x)− 1)) = xf(x)− 1 + F (x), we have:
J(θ2) = (θ + θ2 −R(θ2)) qFB(θ, θ2)− C(qFB(θ, θ2))
+
∫ θ¯
θ
∂qFB
∂θ1
(θ1, θ2)
(
θ1 + θ2 −R(θ2)− C ′(qFB(θ1, θ2))
)
(1− F (θ1))dθ1.
Using the definition of qFB(·) to simplify the last integral yields:
J(θ2) = (θ + θ2 −R(θ2)) qFB(θ, θ2)−C(qFB(θ, θ2))−R(θ2)
∫ θ¯
θ
∂qFB
∂θ1
(θ1, θ2)(1−F (θ1))dθ1.
Therefore, taking expectations with respect to θ2 yields:
I = Eθ2
[
(θ + θ2 −R(θ2)) qFB(θ, θ2)− C(qFB(θ, θ2))
]
−
∫ θ¯
θ
∫ θ¯
θ
∂qFB
∂θ1
(θ1, θ2)(1− F (θ2))(1− F (θ1))dθ1dθ2.
The first term can again be integrated by parts to get:
Eθ2
[
(θ + θ2 −R(θ2)) qFB(θ, θ2)− C(qFB(θ, θ2))
]
= 2θqFB(θ, θ)− C(qFB(θ, θ))
−
∫ θ¯
θ
∂qFB
∂θ2
(θ, θ2)(θ + θ2 − C ′(qFB(θ, θ2)))(1− F (θ2))dθ2
where the last integral is zero by the definition of qFB(·). Gathering everything, we get:
I = 2θqFB(θ, θ)− C(qFB(θ, θ))−
∫ θ¯
θ
∫ θ¯
θ
∂qFB
∂θ1
(θ1, θ2)(1− F (θ2))(1− F (θ1))dθ1dθ2
< 2θqFB(θ, θ)− C(qFB(θ, θ)).
Hence, (26) does not hold for the first-best.
Proof of Lemma 3: The uninformed mediator offers a centralized mechanism
{T1(θi, θ−i), T2(θi, θ−i), q(θi, θ−i)}. Denote Pi’s expected payoff when his type is θi as:
Vi(θi) = θiEθ−i [q(θi, θ−i)− Ti(θi, θ−i)] .
Denote also the agent’s payoff as
U(θ1, θ2) =
2∑
i=1
Ti(θi, θ−i)− C(q(θi, θ−i)).
45
Incentive compatibility implies
V˙i(θi) = Eθ−i [q(θi, θ−i)] (A41)
and
Eθ−i [q(θi, θ−i)] non-decreasing in θi. (A42)
Voluntary participation by the principals and the agent requires respectively:
Vi(θi) ≥ 0 ∀θi (A43)
U(θ1, θ2) ≥ 0 ∀(θ1, θ2). (A44)
The uninformed mediator maximizes now the following objective function:50
E(θ1,θ2)
[
2∑
i=1
α′(θi)f(θi)V (θi) + βU(θ1, θ2)
]
subject to (A41), (A43) and (A44)
for some weights α′(·) to be made precise below. The characterization of those interim
efficient allocations follows then closely Ledyard and Palfrey (1999). First, (A41) implies
Vi(θi) = V (θ) +
∫ θi
θ
Eθ−i [q(x, θ−i)] dx
where we use symmetry to set V1(θ) = V2(θ) = V (θ) ≥ 0. Then, observe that
E(θ1,θ2)
[(
2∑
i=1
θi
)
q(θ1, θ2)− C(q(θ1, θ2))−
2∑
i=1
Vi(θi)
]
= E(θ1,θ2) [U(θ1, θ2)] ≥ 0
where the last inequality follows from (A44). Integrating by parts the left-hand side
above, one gets
E(θ1,θ2)
[(
2∑
i=1
θi −R(θi)
)
q(θ1, θ2)− C(q(θ1, θ2))
]
≥ 2V (θ). (A45)
Integrating by parts the mediator’s objective function, we get:
β
(
E(θ1,θ2)
[(
2∑
i=1
θi −R(θi)
)
q(θ1, θ2)− C(q(θ1, θ2))
])
+
2∑
i=1
∫ θ¯
θ
(1− F (θi))α˜′(θi)Eθ−i [q(θi, θ−i)]θi + 2V (θ)
(∫ θ¯
θ
α′(θ)f(θ)dθ − β
)
(A46)
where α˜′(θi) = 11−F (θi)
∫ θ¯
θi
α′(θ)f(θ)dθ. Hence, any interim efficient allocation must maxi-
mize (A46) subject to (A45). Denote λ the multiplier of this last constraint. Optimizing
the corresponding Lagrangian pointwise yields:
C ′(q(θ1, θ2)) =
2∑
i=1
θi −R(θi)
(
1− α˜
′(θi)
λ+ β
)
50We neglect (A42) which is checked ex post.
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which is the solution when the monotonicity condition (A42) holds; and V (θ) is not infinite
when α˜
′(θ¯)
β+λ
≤ 1. Denoting α(θ) = α˜′(θ)
β+λ
yields (27).
Reciprocally, the fact that a common agency equilibrium satisfies (27) implies that
one can find transfers which implement the corresponding output. Take Ti(θi, θ−i) =
t(q(θi, θ−i), θi) where t(·) is the symmetric contribution schedule.
Proof of Theorem 6: Interim efficient equilibrium links necessarily the equilibrium
output Q(θ) = q(θ, θ) along the diagonal and the function b(θ) because (27) also implies
C ′(Q(θ)) = 2b(θ)
with the extra condition that Q(θ¯) = qFB(θ¯, θ¯) since b(θ¯) = θ¯.
We now prove a lemma which significantly restricts the kind of equilibrium schedules
which may be looked for.
Lemma 7 Any informative equilibrium of a common agency game which is interim effi-
cient satisfies:
∂2p
∂θ∂q
(Q(θ), θ) = 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ. (A47)
Proof: Along the diagonal where both principals have the same type θ, we must have:
b(θ) = p(Q(θ), θ) and θ − b(θ) = R(θ)∂p
∂θ
(Q(θ), θ). (A48)
Let fix an isoquant defined as θ2 = ψ(Q(θ˜), θ1) for some θ˜ ∈ Θ. From (A48), we have:
2∑
i=1
θi − C ′(Q(θ˜)) =
2∑
i=1
R(θi)
∂p
∂θ
(Q(θi), θi). (A49)
Along such isoquant, we have also
θi − p(Q(θ˜), θi) = R(θ−i)∂p
∂θ
(Q(θ˜), θ−i) for i = 1, 2.
Summing over i, we get:
2∑
i=1
θi − C ′(Q(θ˜)) =
2∑
i=1
R(θi)
∂p
∂θ
(Q(θ˜), θi). (A50)
Gathering (A49) and (A50) yields along the isoquant:
R(θ1)
∂p
∂θ
(Q(θ˜), θ1) +R(ψ(Q(θ˜), θ1))
∂p
∂θ
(Q(θ˜), ψ(Q(θ˜), θ1))
= R(θ1)
∂p
∂θ
(Q(θ1), θ1) +R(ψ(Q(θ˜), θ1))
∂p
∂θ
(Q(ψ(Q(θ˜), θ1)), ψ(Q(θ˜), θ1)). (A51)
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This identity should hold for all θ1. We now look at the Taylor expansions of both the
right- and left-hand sides of (A51) around θ˜.
Using (A21) and the fact that θ˜ = ψ(Q(θ˜), θ) yields first
∂ψ
∂θ
(Q(θ˜), θ˜) = −1.
Differentiating once more (A21) with respect to θ and evaluating at θ˜ yields also:
∂2ψ
∂θ2
(Q(θ˜), θ˜) = −2
(
R˙(θ˜)
R(θ˜)
− 1−
∂p
∂θ
(Q(θ˜), θ˜)
θ˜ − C′(Q(θ˜))
2
)
.
For an interim efficient equilibrium (if any), it must be that 0 ≤ 2θ˜ − C ′(Q(θ˜)) =
2R(θ˜)(1− α˜(θ˜)) ≤ 2R(θ˜) and 2θ˜ − C ′(Q(θ˜)) = 2R(θ˜)∂p
∂θ
(Q(θ˜), θ˜) so that ∂p
∂θ
(Q(θ˜), θ˜) ≤ 1.
Since R˙(θ˜) < 0, we have ∂
2ψ
∂θ2
(Q(θ˜), θ˜) > 0. The right- and left-hand sides of (A51) are
equal at θ1 = θ˜ and have both zero first-order derivative at this point. The second-order
derivative for the left-hand side evaluated at θ1 = θ˜ is
∂2ψ
∂θ2
(Q(θ˜), θ˜)
(
R˙(θ˜)
∂p
∂θ
(Q(θ˜), θ˜) +R(θ˜)
∂2p
∂θ2
(Q(θ˜), θ˜)
)
.
The second-order derivative for the right-hand side at θ1 = θ˜ is instead
∂2ψ
∂θ2
(Q(θ˜), θ˜)
(
R˙(θ˜)
∂p
∂θ
(Q(θ˜), θ˜) +R(θ˜)
(
∂2p
∂θ2
(Q(θ˜), θ˜) +
∂2p
∂θ∂q
(Q(θ˜), θ˜)Q˙(θ˜)
))
.
Since Q˙(θ˜) > 0 holds, these second-order derivatives can only be equal when (A47) holds.
Condition (A47) is of course very demanding since, taken with the equilibrium condi-
tions, it fully characterizes the equilibrium Q(·) along the diagonal.
From (14) that we differentiate with respect to q, we have indeed:
∂ψ
∂q
(Q(θ), θ)− C ′′(Q(θ)) + ∂p
∂q
(Q(θ), θ) = R(θ)
∂2p
∂θ∂q
(Q(θ), θ) = 0.
Using also the identity ψ(Q(θ), θ) = θ and differentiating with respect to θ yield:
∂ψ
∂q
(Q(θ), θ)Q˙(θ) +
∂ψ
∂θ
(Q(θ), θ) = 1.
Using ∂ψ
∂θ
(Q(θ), θ) = −1, we finally find
∂p
∂q
(Q(θ), θ) = C ′′(Q(θ)) +
2
Q˙(θ)
.
Moreover, using 2p(Q(θ), θ) = C ′(Q(θ)) and differentiating with respect to θ yields(
2
∂p
∂q
(Q(θ), θ)− C ′′(Q(θ))
)
Q˙(θ) +
∂p
∂θ
(Q(θ), θ) = 0.
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Finally, we have:
2θ − C ′(Q(θ)) = R(θ)∂p
∂θ
(Q(θ), θ) = (4− C ′′(Q(θ))Q˙(θ))R(θ). (A52)
Integrating the differential equation in Q(·) (A52) with the boundary condition requested
by interim efficiency (i.e., C ′(Q(θ¯)) = 2θ¯) shows that the only candidate for an interim
efficient equilibrium has an increasing output along the diagonal given by:
C ′(Q(θ)) = 2b(θ) = 2
(
θ − 1
1− F (θ)
∫ θ
θ
(1− F (x))dx
)
. (A53)
Putting equations (28) (for θ = θ1 = θ2) and (A53) together we get
b(θ) = θ − 1
1− F (θ)
∫ θ
θ
(1− F (x))dx and b(θ) = 1
1− F (θ)
∫ θ
θ
b−1(2b(θ)− b(x))f(x)dx.
(A54)
Simple differentiation of those two equalities with respect to θ shows that necessarily:
b˙(θ) = 2− f(θ)
(1− F (θ))2
∫ θ¯
θ
(1− F (x))dx and b˙(θ)
1− F (θ)
∫ θ
θ
f(x)
b˙(b−1(2b(θ)− b(x)))dx = 1.
Suppose now that b˙(θ) which must be positive (by assumption) is not everywhere
constant. Then, because Θ is compact, b˙(θ) achieves its maximum (resp. its minimum)
at some θ˜ (resp. θ˜′). Either θ˜ or θ˜′ is necessarily different from θ if b˙(θ) is not constant.
Assume thus θ˜ < θ. Then for any x > θ˜, b(·) increasing implies b−1(2b(θ˜) − b(x)) < θ˜,
and thus b˙(b−1(2b(θ˜) − b(x))) < b˙(θ˜), and finally b˙(θ˜)
1−F (θ˜)
∫ θ
θ˜
f(x)
b˙(b−1(2b(θ˜)−b(x)))dx > 1. A
contradiction. If θ˜′ < θ, one shows similarly that b˙(θ˜
′)
1−F (θ˜′)
∫ θ
θ˜′
f(x)
b˙(b−1(2b(θ˜′)−b(x)))dx < 1.
Since b˙(θ) = β for some β ≥ 0 and b(θ¯) = β¯, we immediately obtain, b(θ) = β¯+β(θ−β¯).
Inserting into (A54) yields that R(θ) = 2−β
1−β (θ¯ − θ). This gives a beta-density function
f(θ) = 1+η
(θ−θ)1+η (θ − θ)η where β = 2 + 1η which ensures that R˙(θ) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 1: Immediate from the text.
Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose that principal P2 offers t
∗(q) whatever his own type.
The agent learns nothing from this offer and has no endogenous private information.
Consider principal P1’s best-response. Two possibilities arises. First, he may “agree”
with principal P2 and induce the agent to produce q
∗. This is done by offering also t∗(q)
whatever P1’s type. This yields payoff
W ∗(θ1) = θ1q∗ − C(q
∗)
2
.
The second possibility is that principal P1 deviates and induces another output. The
best of such deviation should solve:
max
{q,t1(·,θ1)}
θ1q − t1(q, θ1) subject to t1(q, θ1)− C(q) ≥ max
{
0,−C(q
∗)
2
}
= 0
49
where the latter condition is the agent’s participation constraint.51 This best deviation
implements the output qˆ(θ) with a forcing contract
t(q, θ1) =
{
C(qˆ(θ1)) > 0 for q = qˆ(θ1)
0 for q 6= qˆ(θ1)
(A55)
and gives payoff Wˆ (θ1) to the deviating principal. This deviation is unprofitable for all
θ1 when:
W ∗(θ1) = θ1q∗ − C(q
∗)
2
≥ Wˆ (θ1), ∀θ1 ∈ Θ. (A56)
Since W ∗′(θ1) = q∗ ≥ qˆ(θ¯) ≥ qˆ(θ1) = Wˆ ′(θ1), (A56) holds everywhere if it holds also at θ.
Hence, offering t∗(q) is a best-response for all θ1 under the assumptions of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3: Suppose that P−i with type θ−i offers t∗(q, ·|θ−i) such that
t∗(q, θˆi|θ−i) = t(q, θ−i) for all θˆ−i ∈ Θ on the equilibrium path when playing in Γ∗. This
choice reveals of course all information on P−i’s type to the agent who gets endogenous
private information on P−i’s type against Pi from that exactly as when playing Γ.
Consider Pi’s best response. First, notice that Pi can achieve the same payoff as in Γ
by offering also the degenerate menu t∗(q, ·|θi) such that t∗(q, θˆi|θi) = t(q, θi) for all θˆi ∈ Θ.
Indeed, the agent’s decision to accept that degenerate menu and to produce accordingly
are the same as in Γ.
Suppose now that Pi makes any other offer, say a menu t˜i(q, ·) 6= t∗(q, ·|θi), we want to
find out-of equilibrium beliefs for the agent that makes offering this menu a suboptimal
strategy for the deviating principal. Consider first the lower envelope of the offered
menu defined as zi(q) = min
θˆi∈Θ
t˜i(q, θˆi) for all q ∈ Q. By continuity of t˜i(q, ·) in θˆi and
compactness of Θ, the Theorem of the Maximum ensures that such lower envelope zi(q) is
well-defined and continuous in q. Define also accordingly any arbitrary selection within the
non-empty compact values and upper semi-continuous correspondence argmin
θˆi∈Θ
t˜i(q, θˆi) as
θˆ0i (q). For any θ−i, define also q(θ−i) a measurable selector from the non-empty compact
values correspondence argmax
q∈Q
zi(q) + t(q, θ−i) − C(q). Such selector exists from the
Measurable Maximum Theorem (Aliprantis and Border, 1999, p. 570) since the above
maximand is a Carathe´odory function. Such measurable selector allows us to compute the
deviating principal’s expected payoff in a meaningful way. Choose now out-of equilibrium
beliefs that put mass one on θˆ0i (q(θ−i)) following any deviation by principal Pi. These
beliefs minimize the agent’s rent from his endogenous private information. Using the
definition of zi(q), observe that, following the deviating menu offer t˜i(q, ·), Pi gets thus at
most the expected payoff Eθ−i [θiq(θ−i)− zi(q(θ−i))].
51This participation constraint takes into account first the possibility to produce q∗ at a loss and second
the possibility of refusing all contracts. Note again that this participation constraint is the same for any
beliefs that the agent may have following principal P1’s unexpected deviation.
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Note then that the contribution zi(q) could also have been offered when playing Γ
and accepted by any type of the agent if max
q∈Q
zi(q) + t(q, θ−i) − C(q) ≥ 0 for any type
θ−i. Such contribution implements the output schedule q(θ−i). Then, by definition of the
equilibrium strategy t(q, θi) in Γ, we necessarily have
Eθ−i [θiq(θ−i)− zi(q(θ−i))] ≤ Eθ−i [θiq(θi, θ−i)− t(q(θi, θ−i), θ−i)]
where q(θi, θ−i) is the equilibrium output in Γ. This ends the proof that the deviating
offer t˜i(q, ·) is dominated.
Proof of Proposition 4: Take any menu of differentiable contribution schedules {t∗2(q, θˆ2)}θˆ2∈Θ
which is incentive compatible for principal P2 and inscrutable, i.e., all types of that prin-
cipal offer this menu and the agent’s prior beliefs on principal P2’s types are unchanged
following such offer. When either accepting this menu or refusing, the agent gets:
Uˆ2 = max
{
0, Eθ2
[
max
q
t∗2(q, θ2)− C(q)
]}
.
Take a menu of contribution schedules {t1(q, θˆ1)}θˆ1∈Θ which is incentive compatible for
principal P1 and also inscrutable. For the agent to accept both menus of contributions,
the following participation constraint must hold:
E(θ1,θ2)
[
max
q
{t1(q, θ1) + t∗2(q, θ2)− C(q)}
]
≥ Uˆ2. (A57)
For differentiable schedules, incentive compatibility for the agent implies the following
first-order condition at any equilibrium output q(θ1, θ2):
∂t1
∂q
(q(θ1, θ2), θ1) +
∂t∗2
∂q
(q(θ1, θ2), θ2) = C
′(q(θ1, θ2)). (A58)
Lemma 8 In any best response to the inscrutable menu {t∗2(q, θˆ2)}θˆ2∈Θ, principal P1 with
type θ1 gets:
V S1 (θ1) = Eθ2
[
max
q
{θ1q + t∗2(q, θ2)− C(q)}
]
− Uˆ2. (A59)
Proof: Consider principal P1 with type θ1. He can always deviate by offering a degenerate
menu {t1(q, θˆ1)}θˆ1∈Θ such that t1(q, θˆ1) = tS1 (q, θ1) for all θˆ1 where tS1 (q, θ1) is the sell-out
contract
tS1 (q, θ1) = θ1q − V S1 (θ1) (A60)
with V S1 (θ1) satisfying (A59) and being the principal’s deviation payoff.
Such sell-out contract aligns the objective of principal P1 with that of the agent.
It induces an output q(θ1, θ2) which is efficient for their bilateral coalition (given the
contributions received from principal P2) and it maximizes their expected bilateral payoff
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when expectations are taken over principal P2’s type which is unknown at the time of
acceptance in any inscrutable equilibrium. This output is thus such that:
θ1 +
∂t∗2
∂q
(q(θ1, θ2), θ2) = C
′(q(θ1, θ2)). (A61)
Finally, V S1 (θ1) is adjusted to leave the agent indifferent between taking this degenerate
menu, in which case his beliefs on the principal’s deviating types are irrelevant, or not.
Lastly, at any best response in the game Γ∗, principal P1 gets precisely V S1 (θ1) whatever
his type. Indeed, such best response would give a set of incentive compatible payoffs
(V1(θ1))θ1∈Θ for principal P1 which, by definition, must weakly Pareto dominate the payoff
vector (V S1 (θ1))θ1∈Θ. However, the payoff vector (V
S
1 (θ1))θ1∈Θ is undominated within the
set of payoffs achievable with incentive compatible allocations and thus there cannot be
other equilibrium payoffs.
To see that the payoff vector (V S1 (θ1))θ1∈Θ is undominated, observe first that this payoff
vector also maximizes the ex ante payoff of principal P1, namely E(θ1,θ2) [θ1q − t1(q, θ1)],
over the set of all incentive feasible allocations that induce the agent to accept principal
P1’s contract. Indeed, because of risk-neutrality and ex ante contracting, the best ex
ante incentive compatible mechanisms obviously implements the bilateral efficient output
that solves (A61). It does so with menus of contributions {t1(q, θ1)}θ1∈Θ of the form
t1(q, θ1) = θ1q − α(θ1) which leave the agent residual claimant for his output decision.
Note that Eθ1 [α(θ1)] is then the principal’s ex ante payoff which is set so that the agent’s
ex ante participation constraint holds as an equality, namely
Eθ1 [α(θ1)] = E(θ1,θ2)
[
max
q
{θ1q + t∗2(q, θ2)− C(q)}
]
− Uˆ2 = Eθ1
[
V S(θ1)
]
.
This last equality shows that the payoff vector (V S1 (θ1))θ1∈Θ is indeed undominated.
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Lemma 9 In any best response to the inscrutable menu {t∗2(q, θˆ2)}θˆ2∈Θ such that t1(q, θ1)
is differentiable in q, principal P1 with type θ1 offers t
S
1 (q, θ1) as part of his menu {t1(q, θˆ1)}θˆ1∈Θ.
Proof: Any menu of differentiable schedules {t1(q, θˆ1)}θˆ1∈Θ in principal P1’s best-response
correspondence must actually satisfy both (A58) and (A61) when his type is θ1. Hence, we
necessarily have ∂t1
∂q
(q, θ1) = θ1. This implies, after integration, that t1(q, θ1) = θ1q−h(θ1)
for some h(·) but we know that h(θ1) = V S(θ1) from Lemma 8.
Altogether, Lemmata 8 and 9 imply also that principal P1 offering the inscrutable
incentive compatible menu {tS1 (q, θˆ1)}θˆ1∈Θ of sell-out contracts is a best response whatever
his type θ1. This is the unique such menu with differentiable schedules. By the same token,
if there exists any inscrutable equilibrium of Γ∗, principal 2 also does the same and offers
the inscrutable menu {tS2 (q, θˆ2)}θˆ1∈Θ where
tS2 (q, θ2) = θ2q − V S2 (θ2). (A62)
52As this proof shows, there may be many different ways of distributing payoffs between the different
types θ1 of principal P1 from an ex ante viewpoint, but only one such allocation corresponds to a best
response in the game where the principal already knows his type when making his offer to the agent.
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Finally, inserting into (A61) yields the first-best output q(θ1, θ2) = q
FB(θ1, θ2). From
(A59), and denoting first-best welfare asW FB(θ1, θ2) = (θ1+θ2)q
FB(θ1, θ2)−C(qFB(θ1, θ2)),
equilibrium payoffs for the principals satisfy the system of equations:
V Si (θi) = Eθ−i
[
W FB(θi, θ−i)− V S−i(θ−i)
]− Uˆ−i for i = 1, 2 (A63)
with
Uˆ−i = max
{
0, Eθ−i
[
Wˆ (θ−i)− V S−i(θ−i)
]}
. (A64)
It is immediate to derive from (A63):
V˙ Si (θi) = Eθ−i
[
qFB(θi, θ−i)
]
(A65)
and thus
V Si (θi) = V
S
i (θ) +
∫ θi
θ
Eθ−i
[
qFB(x, θ−i)
]
dx. (A66)
From (A63) and taking expectations over θi, we get also
2∑
i=1
Eθi
[
V Si (θi)
]
= E(θ1,θ2)
[
W FB(θ1, θ2)
]− Uˆj for j = 1, 2 (A67)
and thus
Uˆ1 = Uˆ2 = Uˆ .
Using (A66) and integrating by parts in the left-hand side of (A67) yields:
2∑
i=1
V Si (θ) = E(θ1,θ2)
[
2∑
i=1
(θi −R(θi))qFB(θ1, θ2)− C(qFB(θ1, θ2))
]
− Uˆ . (A68)
But using (A63) to express V S1 (θ), (A66) to express V
S
2 (θ2) and integrating by parts, we
get also:
2∑
i=1
V Si (θ) = Eθ2
[
(θ + θ2 −R(θ2))qFB(θ, θ2)− C(qFB(θ, θ2))
]− Uˆ .
We already know from the proof of Theorem 5 that
Eθ2
[
(θ + θ2 −R(θ2))qFB(θ, θ2)− C(qFB(θ, θ2))
]
= 2θqFB(θ, θ)− C(qFB(θ, θ)).
Hence, we get:
2∑
i=1
V Si (θ) = 2θq
FB(θ, θ)− C(qFB(θ, θ))− Uˆ .
Inserting into (A68) implies
2θqFB(θ, θ)− C(qFB(θ, θ)) = E(θ1,θ2)
[
2∑
i=1
(θi −R(θi))qFB(θ1, θ2)− C(qFB(θ1, θ2))
]
.
But, we know from Theorem 5 that this equality never holds. Hence, there does not exist
any equilibrium where both principals offer inscrutable mechanisms with differentiable
schedules.
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